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Abstract 
Private health insurance (PHI) plays an important role in the Australian health care system. 
Approximately half of the population is covered by PHI, and the federal government spends 
$6 billion each year on PHI subsidies. One possible justification for this expenditure is that 
PHI directly affects health status. International evidence suggests that health insurance is 
associated with improved physical and mental health. However, all Australians have access 
to a comprehensive public health insurance scheme, Medicare, so the marginal effect of PHI 
may be lower than in other countries with less comprehensive public coverage. This thesis 
examines the relationship between PHI and health status in Australia. As PHI is subject to 
both adverse and advantageous selection, a priori, it could be either negatively or positively 
correlated with health status. This confounds attempts to measure the causal effect. I address 
this issue in three ways using longitudinal data from HILDA, the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia survey. Firstly, I use the rich HILDA dataset to control for a 
range of socioeconomic and lifestyle variables which could be correlated with both PHI and 
health status. This model suggests that PHI positively affects physical and mental health. 
Secondly, I estimate a fixed effects model, which removes unobserved, time-invariant 
individual heterogeneity. In this model, the effect of PHI on health is insignificant for the 
general population. However, for individuals with high psychological distress and women 
who had recently given birth, PHI is associated with improved mental health. Finally, I 
estimate an instrumental variables model, using an indicator for whether an individual is 
over 31 years of age and therefore subject to the government’s Lifetime Health Cover policy. 
This model confirms the null effect for the general population from the fixed effects model. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Private health insurance (PHI) is an entrenched part of the Australian health care system. 
Approximately half of the Australian population is covered by PHI (Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority 2019), and government spending on PHI subsidies amounts to $6.4 
billion, or 8% of the federal health budget (Australian Government 2019). Despite perennial 
concern about growing government expenditure on health, the purpose and value of this 
subsidy have rarely been thoroughly examined (Duckett & Nemet 2019). This thesis 
addresses one aspect of this gap: the effect of PHI on health.  
Australia has a universal public health insurance scheme, usually known as Medicare, which 
provides free public hospital treatment, and subsidised primary and secondary outpatient 
services and pharmaceuticals. In addition to Medicare, individuals may voluntarily purchase 
PHI: either private ancillaries insurance, private hospital insurance, or both. Ancillaries 
insurance covers allied health services such as dentistry, physiotherapy, psychology, and 
optometry. Private hospital insurance covers treatment in private hospitals and treatment as 
a private patient in a public hospital. The key advantages of private treatment for individuals 
are choice of physician, shorter waiting times for elective surgery (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 2017), and better amenities in hospital, such as private rooms.  
Australian PHI advocates often claim that PHI ‘takes the pressure off’ the public sector, by 
encouraging consumers to substitute private hospital care for public hospital care, thereby 
reducing waiting times for all patients (Frech & Hopkins 2004). Empirical support for this 
claim is limited (Duckett 2005). The effect of increased private hospital use on public 
waiting times can be dampened by interactions between the public and private sectors. For 
example, surgeons often operate in both sectors but are better compensated in the private 
sector, so may prioritise private patients (Biglaiser & Ma 2007; Colombo & Tapay 2003; 
DeCoster et al. 1999). Even if PHI does positively affect public waiting times, subsidising 
PHI may not be the most cost-effective way to achieve this outcome (Duckett & Jackson 
2000; Lu & Savage 2006; Vaithianathan 2002). 
Other commonly cited motivations include that private hospitals are more efficient or 
provide better quality care (Barros & Siciliani 2011; Forbes et al. 2010), that PHI facilitates 
consumer choice (Palangkaraya et al. 2009; Walker et al. 2005), and that the subsidies 
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provide indirect support for otherwise underfunded services, such as dental care (Duckett, 
Cowgill & Swerissen 2019). These are all contested (Duckett & Nemet 2019). 
Another possible justification for subsidising PHI is that it directly affects health status. In 
the United States (US), health insurance is associated with improved self-assessed health 
(Barbaresco, Courtemanche & Qi 2015; Finkelstein et al. 2012), mortality (Card, Dobkin & 
Maestas 2009), and mental health (Baicker et al. 2013; Lang 2013). There is also evidence 
of positive effects on health status in other high-income countries, including Switzerland 
(Andersen, Dusheiko & Grassi 2015) and Germany (Hullegie & Klein 2010).  
However, the effect of PHI may depend on the institutional setting. There are significant 
differences between the Australian and US health care systems. Many US studies examine 
the effect of obtaining some level of insurance coverage compared to no insurance, whereas 
all Australians have access to extensive public insurance through Medicare. In the context 
of moral hazard, Aron-Dine, Einav and Finkelstein (2013) argue that the price elasticity of 
health care spending differs according to the level of insurance coverage. Analogously, the 
marginal effect of PHI is likely to differ with the level of coverage. If the health production 
function exhibits diminishing marginal returns (Ehrlich & Chuma 1990), the marginal value 
of additional health care may be smaller in Australia than the US. 
1.2 Mechanisms 
There are several possible channels through which PHI may affect health in Australia, 
although investigation of the exact mechanism is beyond the scope of this study. 
PHI lowers the effective cost of allied health services and private hospital care, inducing 
individuals to consume more of these services (Doiron & Kettlewell 2018; Kettlewell 2018; 
Meng et al. 2017; Savage & Wright 2003). This could improve health status, if the marginal 
effect of this care is positive. Ancillaries coverage could have particularly large health 
effects, if it increases the use of cost-effective preventative care (for example, routine dental 
care), which forestalls the development of more severe conditions (Dalziel & Segal 2007; 
Homeming, Kuipers & Nihal 2012; Thomson et al. 2010).  
Shorter waiting times are another possible mechanism. Waiting times, especially for elective 
surgery, are typically shorter for private patients than public patients (Johar & Savage 2010; 
Shmueli & Savage 2014). This could lead to improvements in health both during and after 
the wait. Patients may experience declining health and increasing pain, physical limitation, 
or anxiety while waiting for a procedure. Patients’ post-operative outcomes could also be 
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affected if they enter surgery in a worse condition because their health declined while 
waiting for treatment (Nikolova, Harrison & Sutton 2016).  
The treatment received by private and public patients also differs once they have been 
hospitalised. Private patients tend to receive a greater number of procedures in the hospital 
and spend more time in intensive care (Shmueli & Savage 2014). Rates of intervention in 
childbirth are higher in private hospitals, partly due to supply-side factors relating to 
incentives for private physicians and hospitals (Dahlen et al. 2014; Einarsdóttir et al. 2012; 
Shorten & Shorten 2004; Yu et al. 2019). These differential patterns of treatment are another 
mechanism by which PHI may improve health status. 
Finally, the mere fact that they are covered by PHI may give consumers a sense of security 
or peace of mind, or reduce the financial stress associated with private health costs, which 
may directly improve mental health (Haushofer et al. 2019; Min et al. 2005; Natalier & 
Willis 2008; Tran, Wassmer & Lascher 2017). 
1.3 Contribution 
The key challenge in estimating the causal effect of PHI is that individuals who take out PHI 
are likely to differ in observable and unobservable ways from those who do not. Asymmetric 
information theory posits that the market for PHI may be characterised by adverse selection: 
individuals with private information about their poor health status, not observable to their 
insurer, will, ceteris paribus, have a greater incentive to purchase PHI (Akerlof 1970; Arrow 
1963). This is because the expected value of insurance for such individuals is greater than 
for healthier individuals, because they anticipate needing more medical care. Adverse 
selection thus predicts a negative correlation between PHI and health status.  
However, more recent empirical studies suggest that, in the aggregate, there is a positive 
correlation between PHI and health status in Australia and other health insurance markets 
(Buchmueller et al. 2013; Doiron, Jones & Savage 2008; Fang, Keane & Silverman 2008). 
This phenomenon is known as advantageous selection. Sources of advantageous selection 
include higher socioeconomic status, lower risk aversion, trust in health care institutions, or 
time preferences (Finkelstein & McGarry 2006). Individuals with these qualities are more 
likely both to purchase PHI and undertake health-improving behaviours. 
In the case of either adverse or advantageous selection, there is likely to be correlation 
between PHI and health status that is not attributable to the causal effect of PHI on health. 
This could lead to biased estimates of the effect of PHI. The objective of this thesis is to 
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describe the relationship between PHI and health status in Australia, and to identify, as far 
as possible, the causal effect of PHI. This work has implications for PHI policy. If PHI has 
an independent, positive effect on health status, the case for government subsidies may be 
stronger. On the other hand, if, individuals with PHI are typically healthier merely due to 
advantageous selection, the marginal benefit of the subsidy may be greater elsewhere (for 
example, in direct expenditure in the public system).  
This thesis investigates this question using longitudinal data from the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. Firstly, a pooled linear model is 
estimated, using the extensive socioeconomic and lifestyle information available in HILDA 
to control for observed sources of selection. In the second section of the analysis, an 
individual fixed effects model is estimated. These models use the longitudinal structure of 
the data to control for unobserved, time-invariant individual heterogeneity. Finally, an 
instrumental variables (IV) model is estimated. This model exploits the exogenous variation 
in PHI status induced by the federal government’s Lifetime Health Cover (LHC) policy. 
This instrument has previously been used to study the effect of PHI on private hospital use 
in Australia (Eldridge, Onur & Velamuri 2017). 
The LHC policy stipulates that individuals who purchase PHI after turning 31 pay a 2% 
penalty on their PHI premium for every year after age 30 that they delayed purchase. For 
example, an individual who purchases PHI at age 35 pays a 10% penalty in addition to the 
standard premium. This provides an incentive for individuals who intend to purchase PHI in 
the future to do so just before turning 31, leading to a discontinuous increase in coverage 
rates at this age. Thus, an indicator for whether an individual is over age 31 is used to 
instrument for PHI status. 
In the first model, which controls only for selection on observed variables, PHI is positively 
correlated with physical and mental health. In the second model, which controls for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, PHI has no effect on health status in the general 
population. However, for individuals with high psychological distress and women who 
recently gave birth, PHI was associated with improved mental health. The IV model 
confirms the null effect of PHI in the general population. 
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1.4 Structure 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the institutional 
context. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical and empirical literature review. Chapter 4 describes 
the dataset and key variables. Chapter 5 describes the econometric framework. Chapter 6 
reports the results. Chapter 7 discusses and concludes. 
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2 Institutional context 
2.1 Interaction of PHI with public health care system 
PHI can interact with public health care systems in many ways. The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (2004) identified four broad classes of interaction: 
1. Duplicate PHI, where PHI covers medically necessary services which are also 
available in the public system; 
2. Complementary PHI, where PHI covers cost-sharing payments in the public system; 
3. Primary PHI, where individuals do not have public cover; and 
4. Supplementary PHI, where PHI covers additional health services not covered by the 
public system or primary PHI. 
In Australia, PHI provides both duplicate coverage (private hospital cover) and 
supplementary coverage (private ancillaries cover). In other countries, PHI serves different 
roles, which must be considered when evaluating international literature on the health effects 
of PHI. In the US, which is the setting of much of the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, PHI 
provides primary coverage for most individuals under 65 years of age. Individuals over 65 
years, or who receive Social Security Disability Insurance, are covered by a public health 
insurance program, Medicare (Folland, Goodman & Stano 2017, p. 516). These individuals 
can also purchase complementary insurance known as Medigap. Other groups of vulnerable 
or needy people – including those with low incomes and pregnant women – are covered by 
Medicaid, another public insurance program (Folland et al. 2017, p. 522). Individuals 
without private or public insurance must bear the full cost of the health care they consume 
privately or, more commonly, receive charity care (Finkelstein, Mahoney & Notowidigdo 
2018). 
2.2 Public health care system 
All Australian citizens and permanent residents are covered by Medicare, a public health 
insurance scheme, which is financed through earmarked (‘Medicare Levy’) and general 
taxes (Duckett & Willcox 2011). All Australians are entitled to receive treatment as a public 
patient in a public hospital with no out-of-pocket cost. This treatment is partly funded by 
Medicare, and partly by state governments, who also operate the hospitals. Alternatively, 
patients can elect to be treated in a private hospital, or as a private (paying) patient in a public 
hospital. In this case, Medicare covers part of the cost of physician services, but does not 
cover other costs, such as inpatient accommodation (Biggs 2017). Medicare also subsidises 
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outpatient medical services provided by primary and secondary private practitioners, who 
charge largely unregulated fees for services (Biggs 2016). Medicare is complemented by the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, which subsidises the cost of approved prescription 
medicines.  
Public funding of allied and mental health services is less comprehensive. Some services are 
provided in public hospitals or community health practices, but funding is often limited 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018). Individuals with mental health conditions 
can receive a mental health treatment plan from their general practitioner, entitling them to 
receive a maximum of ten subsidised sessions with a mental health professional each year 
(Department of Human Services 2019). Similarly, individuals with chronic diseases can 
receive Medicare funding for a maximum of five allied health services per year, which can 
be less than is clinically required (Foster et al. 2008). Public support for dental services is 
particularly limited: the majority of funding comes from private sources (Duckett et al. 
2019). 
2.3 Australian PHI market 
Consumers can voluntarily purchase private hospital cover, ancillaries cover, or both. As at 
30 June 2019, 44.2% of the population was covered by private hospital insurance, and 53.5% 
were covered by ancillaries insurance (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2019). 
Unlike in the US, PHI is usually purchased by individuals and is not tied to employment.  
Private hospital insurance covers part of the fee for private hospital services, and may also 
cover other out-of-pocket costs such as accommodation charges. Private ancillaries 
insurance (also known as general treatment or extras cover) covers services provided by 
allied and complementary health providers, such as optometrists, dentists, physiotherapists, 
chiropractors, psychologists, and others. It may also cover medical devices such as glasses, 
contact lenses, hearing aids and prostheses. Insurers are not permitted to cover outpatient 
general practitioner or specialist services, or diagnostic imaging and tests. 
The key benefits of PHI are shorter waiting times for elective surgery (Australian Institute 
of Health and Welfare 2017), choice of physician, and better amenities in hospital, such as 
private rooms. In a recent survey by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2017), consumers 
nominated a range of reasons for purchasing PHI. Table 1 summarises the most common 
reasons. Some correspond to the objective benefits of PHI, such as shorter waiting times 
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(43%) and choice of doctor (34%), but the most common reason (68%) is intangible: 
‘security/protection/peace of mind.’  
TABLE 1: Reasons for having PHI (multiple reasons could be nominated) 
Security/protection/peace of mind 67.9% 
Allows treatment as private patient in hospital 47.3% 
Provides benefits for ancillary services/"extras" 43.2% 
Shorter wait for treatment/concern over public hospital waiting lists 42.9% 
Choice of doctor 34.2% 
Always had it/parents pay it/condition of job 29.5% 
To gain government benefits/avoid extra Medicare levy 21.9% 
Lifetime cover/avoid age surcharge 21.1% 
Elderly/getting older/likely to need treatment 15.1% 
Has illness/condition that requires treatment 10.1% 
Other financial reasons 4.3% 
Other reason 5.0% 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] (2017)  
 
Federal government legislation requires that PHI premiums are community rated: insurers 
cannot charge higher premiums, or deny coverage, to higher risk individuals.1 Nonetheless, 
there is substantial variation in PHI premiums, reflecting variation in coverage, out-of-
pocket costs, waiting periods and other contractual conditions. The cheapest policies have 
large excesses (amounts payable upfront by consumers when they claim a hospital stay) and 
co-payments (amounts payable for each service claimed), and exclude coverage for many 
common procedures (Russell 2017). For hospital treatments, maximum waiting periods are 
legislated: twelve months for obstetrics and pre-existing conditions, and two months for 
most other services, including psychiatric care, rehabilitation and palliative care, regardless 
of whether the condition was pre-existing (Biggs 2017). There are no legislated maximum 
waiting periods for ancillaries coverage. 
Single, couple, and family PHI policies can be purchased. Typically, children are eligible to 
remain on their parents’ policies until they turn 21, or until they turn 25 if they are studying 
full-time. Some insurers also offer coverage, at additional cost, for all children under 25, 
even if they are not studying.  
                                                 
1 From 1 April 2019, insurers could offer youth discounts to individuals less than 30 (Sivey & Cheng 2019). 
This policy was not in place when the data used in this thesis were collected. 
18 
 
2.4 Federal government PHI policies 
Three federal government policies provide incentives for individuals to purchase PHI: 
premium subsidies, tax penalties, and Lifetime Health Cover. This framework was first 
established in 1997. Concerned about a long-term decline in coverage rates, the federal 
government introduced ‘carrot and stick’ measures to increase PHI coverage (Hall, De 
Abreu Lourenco & Viney 1999). These consisted of PHI subsidies for low-income earners, 
and a tax penalty for uninsured high-income earners. In 1999, the means-tested rebate was 
replaced by a uniform 30% rebate on all PHI premiums. Finally, on 1 July 2000, Lifetime 
Health Cover (LHC) was introduced. This policy mandated that those purchasing PHI after 
turning 31 would pay an additional 2% on their annual PHI premium for each year after age 
30 that they delayed, providing an incentive for individuals to purchase PHI while young. 
Figure 1 shows that the combined impact of the three policy changes on PHI coverage was 
large. From a minimum of around 30% in 1996, the coverage rate increased about 15 
percentage points to 45% by 2001. The coverage rate has been approximately constant since 
then, but this aggregate stability masks changes in the composition of those covered: 
coverage among those aged over 70 has increased, while the number of young people with 
PHI has decreased (Duckett & Nemet 2019). 
Figure 1: Proportion of the population with hospital treatment cover, per cent.  
Source: Duckett and Nemet (2019) 
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2.4.1 Rebates 
PHI subsidies, referred to as rebates, are the most expensive component of the suite of PHI 
incentives from the perspective of government. Unlike the LHC or the revenue-raising MLS, 
the rebates are a large recurrent health expense. In 2018-19, the cost of the rebate was $6.39 
billion, or 7.9% of the total federal health budget (Australian Government, 2019). For this 
reason, the rationale for the rebate has been the subject of considerable debate (Duckett & 
Jackson 2000; Frech & Hopkins 2004; Gans & King 2003; Hindle & McAuley 2004; 
Vaithianathan 2002). 
Despite this, the policy has not changed significantly since 1999. The only changes have 
been increases in the rebate rates for elderly people in 2005 (Kettlewell, Stavrunova & 
Yerokhin 2018) and the reintroduction of means testing in 2012 (Robson & Paolucci 2012). 
Four income tiers were defined, with the rebate rate decreasing with each tier to reach zero 
for the highest income tier. The MLS rate also increased in each tier. The rebate rates and 
income brackets for 2016-17 (corresponding to wave 17 of the HILDA survey) are shown 
in Table 2. 
TABLE 2: PHI rebate and MLS rates for 2016-17 
  Base tier Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
Single $90,000 or 
less 
$90,001 – 
$105,000 
$105,001 – 
$140,000 
$140,001 or 
more 
Familya $180,000 or 
less 
$180,001 – 
$210,000 
$210,001 – 
$280,000 
$280,001 or 
more 
Rebate rate – under 
65 years 
26.791% 17.861% 8.930% 0% 
Rebate rate – 65-69 
years 
31.256% 22.326% 13.395% 0% 
Rebate rate – over 70 
years 
35.722% 26.791% 17.861% 0% 
Medicare Levy 
Surcharge 
0% 1% 1.25% 1.5% 
a The family income threshold increases by $1,500 for each child after the first. 
Note: Rebate rates applied 1 July 2016 – 31 March 2017.  
Source: Australian Taxation Office (2019b) 
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2.4.2 Medicare Levy Surcharge 
The MLS imposes a tax penalty on individuals who earn more than the specified income 
threshold and are not covered by private hospital insurance. The thresholds for single 
persons are reported in Table 4. For individuals with a spouse or dependent child, combined 
family income is compared to the family income threshold, which is double the single 
threshold, plus $1,500 for each additional child after the first. However, regardless of family 
income, individuals are not liable for the MLS if their personal income is below a specified 
low-income threshold, also reported in Table 3. 
TABLE 3: MLS single income threshold over sample period 
Financial year Low-income 
threshold 
Single income 
threshold 
MLS rate 
2011-12 $19,404 $80,000 1% 
2012-13 $20,542 $84,000 1% 
$97,000 1.25% 
$130,000 1.5% 
2013-14 $20,542 $88,000 1% 
$102,000 1.25% 
$136,000 1.5% 
2014-15 to 2016-17 $20,896 $90,000 1% 
$105,000 1.25% 
$140,000 1.5% 
Source: (Australian Taxation Office 2019a) 
 
2.4.3 Lifetime Health Cover 
LHC applies to individuals who are not covered by private hospital insurance on the 1st of  
July following their 31st birthday (Private Health Insurance Ombudsman)(Private Health 
Insurance Ombudsman, 2013). If these individuals decide to purchase hospital insurance 
later in life, they pay an additional 2% penalty on top of their premium for each year they 
are aged over 30. For example, if an individual purchases PHI at age 35, they pay an 
additional 2%×5=10% penalty in addition to the standard premium. The maximum loading 
is 70%, which applies to individuals who take out hospital insurance at age 65 or later. The 
penalty is removed after an individual has continuously held hospital coverage for ten years. 
Couples pay the average of the individual loadings.  
The LHC policy was designed to address adverse selection (see Section 3.1.2) by providing 
an incentive for young, typically healthy, people to purchase PHI (Duckett & Nemet 2019). 
21 
 
Brown and Connelly (2005) modelled the impact of LHC on the PHI risk pool, in a standard 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) insurance model. They predicted that the policy would not 
result in full insurance or substantially improve the risk pool, because low-risk older persons 
would purchase less insurance due to the age penalty. However, Buchmueller (2008) 
examined the same question empirically. He found that the policy led to a substantial 
increase in the number of young people covered, offsetting the previous trend of adverse 
selection in the market. 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
The market for health has several special features. It is characterised by information 
asymmetry (Arrow 1985), irreducible uncertainty (Pauly 1978), and concern for equity (Sen 
2002). This section will outline some key theoretical concepts and their implications for the 
empirical analysis. 
3.1.1 The demand for health 
The standard model of demand for health was described by Grossman (1972). In this model, 
health is modelled as a capital good, similar to human capital. Individuals inherit a stock of 
health, which depreciates with age and can be increased with investments of time and market 
goods, such as diet, exercise and health care. Health is both a consumption good, directly 
entering the utility function, and an investment good, affecting the time available for 
working and producing other commodities. Individuals maximise utility, which depends on 
health and other commodities, subject to a budget constraint and a time constraint. The first 
order conditions of the model imply that the marginal cost of health capital must be equal to 
the marginal benefit.  
Grossman’s model has several implications for this thesis. The first relates to the insight that 
health is a capital good, determined by the accumulation of health inputs over an individual’s 
life. This implies that the marginal change in health in any one period is likely to be small, 
relative to the stock of health capital. Thus, even if the marginal effect of PHI on health is 
positive, this effect may not be detectable in the short term, or in fixed effects models, where 
identification comes from contemporaneous changes in PHI status and health status. 
Grossman (1972) also emphasises that medical care and other goods are substitutes in the 
health production function. The opportunity cost of the expenditure on PHI is expenditure 
on other goods, which may also positively effect health. Thus, the health effect of the 
additional medical care may be muted. 
A limitation of the Grossman model is that it assumes that the health production function is 
characterised by constant returns to scale. The model has been extended to feature 
diminishing returns to scale (Ehrlich & Chuma 1990). Diminishing returns are intuitively 
appealing: at low levels of health, small and comparatively low-cost interventions such as 
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sanitation can substantially improve health, whereas in healthier people much larger 
investments may be needed to improve health (Wagstaff 1986).2  
Diminishing returns to health care suggests that in Australia, where all individuals have 
access to a comprehensive public health insurance scheme, the marginal value of additional 
health care obtained due to PHI may be low. By contrast, in the US, the uninsured typically 
have much lower levels of health care use. Hence, the marginal value of insurance-provided 
health care may be higher. Thus, the effects of health insurance may differ between the US 
and Australia.  
Another limitation of the Grossman model is that it does not account for the fact that 
individuals’ future health states are unknown. Hence, the demand for insurance cannot be 
directly determined from the model. Explicit models of health insurance are considered in 
the next section. 
3.1.2 The demand for health insurance 
Arrow (1963) developed a basic model of the demand for health insurance for risk-averse 
individuals who maximise expected utility. In his model, individuals experience random 
negative health shocks. When this shock occurs, they must spend a fixed sum on medical 
care, reducing the income available to spend on other goods and hence, utility. Unlike in 
Grossman’s model, health does not enter the utility function directly. Because they are risk 
averse, individuals prefer to pay a fixed premium equal to the expected value of the loss, 
rather than face the risk themselves. This gives rise to the market for health insurance. This 
income smoothing quality could lead to a positive effect on health, if there is a positive but 
diminishing relationship between income and health status. However, in this model, 
insurance does not affect the quantity of health care consumed. 
Arrow’s (1963) model did not fully account for the fact that the market for PHI is 
characterised by asymmetric information, in the form of ‘hidden action’ and ‘hidden 
information.’ Hidden action refers to the fact that insurers cannot perfectly observe 
consumers’ actions, for example, their level of exercise or other health-improving 
behaviours. Thus, insured consumers might take fewer precautions because they bear less 
of the burden of ill health (Ehrlich & Becker 1972). This phenomenon, known as ex ante 
                                                 
2 However, Galama et al. (2012) found mixed evidence for diminishing returns in an analysis of household-
level data. 
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moral hazard, is a variant of the general principal-agent problem (Arrow 1985). It could lead 
to a negative correlation between PHI and health status, but has received little attention in 
the empirical literature (Einav & Finkelstein 2018). 
Hidden information refers to the fact that insurers cannot perfectly observe consumers’ 
health states. This gives rise to ex-post moral hazard, more commonly known simply as 
moral hazard, described by Pauly (1968). The hidden information means that, in practice, 
insurers must pay for the consumer’s care as it arises, rather than providing a fixed transfer 
for each health state as in Arrow’s model. This reduces the effective price of medical care 
for consumers which, unless demand is perfectly inelastic, leads to an increase in the 
quantity of care demanded. The key implication of Pauly’s model was that, unlike in 
Arrow’s model, insurance could lead to a deadweight loss: individuals demanded care 
beyond the point where the social marginal cost exceeded the marginal benefit, because of 
this price distortion. For the individual, however, assuming that the marginal effect of the 
additional health care is positive, this increased health care utilisation could lead to improved 
health outcomes. 
Hidden information also leads to selection, a key challenge to accurate estimation of the 
causal effect of PHI. Akerlof (1970) described the issue of adverse selection, where, for a 
fixed premium, the expected value of purchasing insurance is greater for high-risk 
individuals than low-risk individuals, because their probability of becoming sick in the next 
period is greater (Rothschild & Stiglitz 1976). Thus, high-risk individuals have a greater 
incentive to purchase insurance, leading to an insured pool which is higher risk than the 
general population. Insurers must then raise premiums, making insurance even less attractive 
for relatively healthy individuals. This can lead to an adverse selection “death spiral” which 
renders the insurance market unsustainable in the long run (Cutler & Zeckhauser 2000, p. 
54). 
Adverse selection can be even more pronounced in countries such as Australia, where 
individuals have access to a public health care system. Olivella and Vera‐Hernández (2012) 
model this case and predict that, for substitute insurance such as hospital cover, only high-
risk types will purchase insurance. Further, community rating legislation (see Section 2.3), 
which prohibits insurers from using even observable information such as an individual’s age 
in setting premiums, can further exacerbate adverse selection. 
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Adverse selection predicts a negative correlation between PHI and health status (Chiappori 
& Salanié 2000). However, the market for PHI is characterised by multiple dimensions of 
private information (Finkelstein & McGarry 2006). Empirical studies suggest that, in 
aggregate, the correlation between PHI and health status is positive. This phenomenon is 
known as advantageous selection. Theoretically, risk aversion has been hypothesised as a 
source of advantageous selection: more risk averse individuals have a preference for 
insurance and are more likely to take risk-reducing preventative actions (de Meza & Webb 
2001; Hemenway 1990). Empirically, many other factors have been identified which are 
positively correlated with both insurance preference and health could lead to this positive 
correlation, including cognitive ability and socioeconomic status (Fang et al. 2008). Other 
sources of advantageous selection, which may be more difficult to observe, include time 
preference or trust in the health care system. 
In either case – adverse or advantageous selection – estimates of the health effect of PHI are 
likely to be biased. This is the central empirical challenge of this study. This thesis uses three 
strategies to deal with this issue: selection on observables, fixed effects, and instrumental 
variables. 
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3.2 Empirical literature review 
This chapter provides a summary of the literature regarding the causal effect of health 
insurance on health status. There have been many reviews of this extensive literature 
(Gaudette, Pauley & Zissimopoulos 2017; Hadley 2003; Levy & Meltzer 2008; McWilliams 
2009; Sommers, Gawande & Baicker 2017a). This chapter focuses on seminal papers and 
the studies most similar to this thesis. 
3.2.1 Methodological approaches 
Studies investigating the health effects of health insurance fall into three methodological 
categories: randomised controlled trial (RCT) studies, quasi-experimental studies, and 
longitudinal studies.  
Randomised controlled trials involve randomly assigning participants to a treatment (health 
insurance) or control group, and measuring health outcomes over time. Because the 
assignment is random, in expectation, the distribution of observable and unobservable 
characteristics should be identical between the two groups. Thus, the difference in average 
health status between the treatment and control groups provides an unbiased estimate of the 
causal effect of health insurance. 
Quasi-experimental and observational studies both rely on non-experimental data. Quasi-
experimental studies identify the effect of PHI by comparing health outcomes across groups 
which are plausibly similar, except that one is more likely to be have PHI than the other 
(Wallace & Sommers 2016). Sources of this plausibly exogenous variation include 
geographic or temporal variation in government policy, or strict cut-offs for the application 
of government policies or programs, such that individuals just above or below the cut-off 
are virtually identical but for their treatment status. 
Observational studies attempt to isolate the effect of PHI by controlling for observed and 
unobserved sources of heterogeneity, which could bias the estimated effect of PHI. 
‘Selection on observables’ studies control for observed confounding variables, either in 
linear regression or through propensity score matching. This provides an unbiased estimate 
of the treatment effect if all variables correlated with both PHI status and health status are 
observed and controlled for. Another approach for longitudinal observational data is fixed 
effects, which exploits within-person variation in the variables to remove time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, instrumental variables can be used. This involves 
identifying variables which are correlated with health status only through their relationship 
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with PHI status, in effect providing exogenous variation in PHI status. This can be used to 
derive an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. 
Each of these methods has strengths and weaknesses. The traditional view is that causal 
relationships can only be deduced from RCTs. Holland (1986, p. 959), for example, opined 
that there can be “no causation without manipulation;” that is, that causal effects cannot be 
inferred from non-experimental data. Other writers have rejected this view (Heckman 2010; 
Leamer 1983; Pearl 2009). Deaton and Cartwright (2018) note that the fact that RCT 
estimates are unbiased in expectation does not necessarily imply that the results of any one 
RCT represent the true causal effect. Further, even if the estimates of RCTs are unbiased, 
there is a trade-off between this high ‘internal validity,’ that is, whether the effect identified 
represents a causal effect for the study population, and ‘external validity,’ or the extent to 
which the results are informative in other settings (Angrist & Pischke 2009a, p. 151). 
Estimated treatment effects only apply to the sample selected for the trial, yet, in practice, 
the estimates are often applied much more widely (Aron-Dine et al. 2013).  
There are also many important, policy-relevant research questions which, currently, can only 
feasibly be investigated in observational data, such as the effect of PHI on long-term 
outcomes such as mortality. Observational data also provide the opportunity for researchers 
to examine how and why a treatment causes an effect, which RCTs, which typically treat 
the treatment as a “black-box,” cannot elucidate (Heckman & Vytlacil 2007, p. 4788). 
3.2.2 Randomised controlled trial (RCT) evidence 
3.2.2.1 RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) was conducted between 1974 and 1981 
(Newhouse & Insurance Experiment Group 1993). Approximately 2000 households from 
six US cities were randomly assigned to health insurance plans with varying levels of cost-
sharing. Some households were assigned to a free care plan, where the insurer paid all 
medical costs. Others were assigned to plans with higher levels of cost-sharing, up to a 
randomly assigned maximum annual medical expenditure cap. After this upper limit was 
reached, all medical expenditures were covered by the insurer. 
The HIE found that total medical spending decreased as the cost-sharing rate increased. 
However, for most health measures, there were no statistically significant differences in 
health outcomes across insurance plans (Brook et al. 1983; Newhouse & Insurance 
Experiment Group 1993). The only exceptions were for initially unhealthy, low-income 
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individuals. This group had better corrected vision and lower blood pressure in the free care 
plan compared to the cost-sharing plans. Lower income persons also reported fewer serious 
symptoms in the free care plan.  
The findings for mental health were mixed (Newhouse & Insurance Experiment Group 
1993). Individuals with initially poor mental health status, especially those with low 
incomes, had better outcomes in the free plan compared to cost-sharing plans (Wells, 
Manning & Valdez 1989). By contrast, individuals with initially good mental health status, 
especially those with low and middle incomes, had better outcomes in the cost-sharing plans 
compared to the free plan. However, the authors note that utilisation of mental health 
services was low, even in the free plan. 
The results of the HIE have been influential in academic and policy work. However, the 
validity of the original estimates has been questioned (Newhouse et al. 2008; Nyman 2007; 
2008). Consequently, Aron-Dine et al. (2013) re-evaluated the original HIE findings 
regarding health care utilisation and moral hazard using modern analytical techniques. Their 
work broadly supported the original finding of higher spending in the free care plan, but 
there was significant uncertainty in the magnitude of the effect. They did not re-examine the 
HIE findings on the effects of insurance on health. 
3.2.2.2 Oregon experiment 
Another RCT was conducted in Oregon from 2008 (Finkelstein et al. 2012). The state 
opened its Medicaid program for low-income individuals to a limited number of new 
enrolments, and allocated the new places by lottery. Administrative and survey data were 
collected on the health and health care utilisation of those who were chosen in the Medicaid 
lottery and those who were not. 
Individuals who were insured had higher health care utilisation in the first two years of the 
study (Baicker et al. 2013; Finkelstein et al. 2012). The treatment group also had 
significantly better self-reported general and mental health in the first year after the lottery 
(Finkelstein et al. 2012). However, in the second year, there was no difference between the 
treatment and control groups on clinical measures of physical health, including blood 
pressure, cholesterol, and a diabetes marker (Baicker et al. 2013). There was also no 
difference in the probability of being diagnosed with or taking medication for hypertension 
or high cholesterol, although individuals with insurance were more likely to be diagnosed 
with and take medication for diabetes. However, insurance was associated with a significant 
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reduction in the probability of individuals screening positive for depression, and a significant 
increase in the probability of individuals reporting a diagnosis of depression, though no 
change in medication for depression. 
The difference between the physical health results in the first and second years of the study 
may be due to the subjective measures of health used in the first year. Finkelstein et al. 
(2012) noted that approximately two-thirds of the improvement in self-reported health 
occurred immediately after individuals were informed of the lottery result, before they 
actually enrolled in Medicaid and before their health care utilisation increased. Thus, the 
effect might represent a “general sense of improved wellbeing” (Finkelstein et al. 2012, p. 
1096) rather than an improvement in objective health. This is consistent with the positive 
effects for mental health over both years. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the health production function exhibits diminishing marginal 
returns. This might explain why the Oregon RCT reported positive effects for some health 
measures (self-reported health and depression), whereas the RAND RCT reported virtually 
none. The Oregon experiment examined the effect of insurance on the extensive margin (the 
effect of acquiring some insurance coverage compared to no insurance coverage) whereas 
the RAND experiment measured effects on the intensive margin: the effect of plans of 
differing design and generosity. Thus, the marginal effect of health care utilisation in the 
Oregon experiment may have been larger than in the RAND experiment. 
3.2.3 Quasi-experimental evidence 
3.2.3.1 Difference-in-difference evidence 
Many US studies have identified health effects by exploiting cross-state variation in health 
insurance policy through difference-in-difference models (Sommers 2017). This empirical 
strategy is not directly applicable in the Australian context, as government PHI policy is 
determined federally, so there is no variation across states. Nonetheless, the results are 
informative about the impact of PHI on health more generally. 
One strand of the US literature has used difference-in-differences to evaluate the effect of 
Massachusetts’ 2006 health insurance reforms (Boudreaux, Dagher & Lorch 2018). The 
reforms included the establishment of a PHI exchange, expanded Medicaid coverage for 
low-income adults, subsidies for low- and middle-income households, and a tax penalty for 
those without coverage. Most studies have reported that the reforms positively affected 
health status. Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) and Miller (2012a; 2012b) found significant, 
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positive effects on self-assessed health for children and adults, though Zhu et al. (2010) 
found no significant effect on the same measure. Van Der Wees, Zaslavsky and Ayanian 
(2013) also found that the reforms positively affected self-reported general health, as well 
as the probability that an individual reported good physical and mental health in the past 
month. The effects were larger for those with low incomes. Sommers, Long and Baicker 
(2014) reported a significant reduction in mortality, though Kaestner (2016) challenged their 
methodology and found no effect using an alternative method. 
There was also geographic variation in the 2014 implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), which comprised a package of policies similar to the Massachusetts reforms. Most 
studies have focussed on differences in health outcomes between states which did and did 
not expand Medicaid to cover low-income childless adults. Difference-in-difference studies 
exploiting this variation generally found positive effects on self-reported health status (Black 
et al. 2019; Courtemanche et al. 2018; Miller & Wherry 2017; Sommers et al. 2015; 
Sommers et al. 2017b). 
Another element of the ACA was the Dependent Coverage Provision (DCP), which allowed 
young people aged 19-25 to remain covered on their parents’ health insurance plans. 
Previously, dependents were usually dropped at 19 years of age, or 23 years for student 
dependents. Several papers have used difference-in-differences to compare those newly able 
to remain covered (aged 19-25) to a slightly older control group (aged over 26) who 
remained ineligible before and after implementation of the DCP (Chua & Sommers 2014; 
Wallace & Sommers 2015). For example, Barbaresco et al. (2015) compared the health 
outcomes of those aged 23 to 25 and those aged 27 to 29 before and after the DCP came into 
effect. They found a positive effect of coverage on the probability of self-reporting excellent 
health, but not on other self-assessed health outcomes, including number of days with poor 
mental or physical health.  
Difference-in-difference models have also been used to study the effect of mental health 
parity laws. These laws, passed by many US states in the early 1990s and 2000s, required 
that insurers offer coverage for mental health care at a level comparable to their physical 
health care coverage (Klick & Markowitz 2006). Lang (2013) showed that implementation 
of these laws led to a significant reduction in suicide rates, suggesting that the increased 
coverage of mental health services led to improved mental health outcomes. 
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Other difference-in-difference studies define treatment and control groups on the basis of 
socioeconomic status, where only some individuals were affected by a health insurance 
policy change (Grignon, Perronnin & Lavis 2008; He & Nolen 2019). For example, 
Andersen et al. (2015) investigated the effect of a reduction in health insurance subsidy in 
Switzerland on mortality. Swiss law requires that all residents purchase health insurance, 
but the insurance policies vary in generosity. The government provides either a complete 
subsidy to very poor or disabled people or a partial subsidy based on the household’s 
financial capacity. In 2005, there was a decrease in the maximum partial subsidy and a 
reduction in the income eligibility threshold. There was no change to the complete subsidy. 
Thus, complete subsidy recipients formed the control group and partial subsidy recipients 
the treatment group. Difference-in-difference estimates indicated that mortality increased as 
a result of the subsidy reduction. They proposed two mechanisms for this adverse health 
effect: individuals choosing less generous health insurance plans, and an income effect. They 
identified evidence for both mechanisms, but their strategy relied on the assumption of 
adverse selection in the health insurance market, which has been questioned empirically (see 
Section 3.1.2). 
3.2.3.2 Regression discontinuity evidence 
Regression discontinuity designs (RDDs) are another quasi-experimental method which 
have been used to identify the effect of health insurance on health coverage. Age thresholds 
in eligibility for health insurance policies have often been used. For example, many US 
papers have examined the effects of the discontinuity in insurance coverage at age 65 arising 
from Medicare eligibility (Card, Dobkin & Maestas 2008; Decker & Remler 2004; 
Finkelstein & McKnight 2008; Lichtenberg 2002). Card et al. (2009) used an RDD to 
examine mortality rates following emergency hospital admission among those just under 
and just over age 65. They found a 20% reduction in mortality for those just over 65 
compared to those just under 65. Part of this decline was attributable to increased treatment 
for the previously uninsured, but this group was too small to drive the entire effect. Another 
mechanism was increases in treatment intensity, such as the number of procedures, for those 
who previously had private insurance which was less generous than Medicare. This suggests 
that increases in insurance coverage along the intensive, as well as extensive, margin may 
have positive health effects. 
Shigeoka (2014) also used an RDD to investigate the effect of changes in insurance 
generosity among the elderly. In Japan, government policy requires that all citizens purchase 
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health insurance, which usually have cost-sharing conditions, where consumers pay a 
percentage of any medical costs they incur. However, government policy also mandates that 
cost-sharing significantly decreases at age 70, resulting in lower out-of-pocket costs for 
consumers. RDD estimates indicated that this policy significantly increased health care 
utilisation, but there were no significant effects on mortality or self-reported physical or 
mental health. 
Other studies have examined the effect of insurance on health around age 19 in the US, the 
age at which, prior to the implementation of the ACA, young adults could no longer be 
covered on their parents’ health insurance plans (Anderson, Dobkin & Gross 2012; Cardella 
& Depew 2014; Coey 2015; Lee 2018; Timmins 2012). Yörük (2016), using an RDD, found 
that insurance coverage was not associated with a statistically significant difference in self-
reported health. 
Other RDD studies have examined the effect of insurance at income thresholds which 
determine eligibility for government insurance programs (Bernal, Carpio & Klein 2017; 
Guthmuller & Wittwer 2017; Koch 2013). De La Mata (2012) used an RDD to investigate 
health outcomes for children whose family incomes are just above and just below the 
Medicaid eligibility threshold. She found that the probability of being covered by a public 
insurance program significantly increased for children just below the threshold, but private 
insurance coverage decreased by the same magnitude, suggesting a crowding out effect. 
There was no effect on the probability that a child had excellent caregiver-reported health, 
nor on the number of school days missed due to illness. Thus, this study suggests that 
substitution between private and public health insurance, despite potential differences in the 
generosity and conditions of coverage, may not have significant health consequences. 
Hullegie and Klein (2010) used a similar strategy to examine the effect of PHI on self-
assessed health in Germany. In Germany, public health insurance is compulsory, but 
individuals who are above a high-income threshold may elect to purchase private insurance 
instead, surrendering their public insurance. The public scheme is characterised by income-
based premiums and small co-payments. By contrast, private insurers set premiums on the 
basis of age and health status, and can charge larger co-payments. Private patients are 
typically treated more intensively, and have shorter waiting times, than public patients. Thus, 
the German system is similar to Australia in that both feature a private sector which is 
perceived as superior (Petilliot 2017). However, the fact that privately insured individuals 
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in Germany cannot access the public system, and that in Australia, PHI premiums are 
community rated, are important differences between the two health care systems. 
Hullegie and Klein (2010) reported that private insurance was associated with better self-
assessed health. However, this finding that could be attributable either to superior private 
treatment, or to the greater incentive for privately insured individuals, who are more exposed 
to the cost of medical care through co-payments, to undertake preventative care. 
3.2.4 Longitudinal observational studies 
Longitudinal data has most commonly been used to examine the effect of health insurance 
on long-term outcomes such as mortality. Several papers have attempted to identify the 
causal effect of health insurance by controlling for observed potential confounders, reporting 
a mix of positive and null effects (Hogan et al. 2015; Kronick 2009; McWilliams et al. 2004; 
Probst et al. 2008; Sareen et al. 2016; Wilper et al. 2009). For example, Black et al. (2017) 
estimated the effect of initial insurance status at age 51-61 on mortality and health over 
twenty years, controlling for an extensive set of covariates through propensity score 
matching and allowed the effect of insurance to vary over time. They found little evidence 
that insurance improved mortality, self-reported overall health, difficulties with Activities 
of Daily Living, heart disease, stroke, diabetes or depression. This contradicts the significant 
positive effects reported in other studies, a difference they attribute partly to the fact that 
previous work introduced bias by excluding the publicly insured (who are typically 
unhealthier than the uninsured) from the analytical sample.  
Other studies have examined the effect of changes in insurance status on health (Baker et al. 
2006; DeLeire 2019; McWilliams et al. 2007). These papers are similar to the fixed effects 
section of this thesis in that they exploit variation in insurance status over time, rather than 
insurance status at a single point in time. With appropriate time-varying controls, this may 
be more convincingly exogenous than point-in-time studies. 
Baker et al. (2002) studied the effect of losing insurance coverage in one two-year interval 
on changes in health in the next two-year interval. This timing meant that they could isolate 
the direction of causality: health declines could not be the cause of the loss of insurance, and 
it was less likely that both were the result of some unobserved event, such as unemployment. 
Their dependent variables were the development of a new mobility difficulty or a major 
decline in self-reported health. Controlling for baseline socioeconomic and health status, 
they found that those who lost private insurance were at greater risk of a major decline in 
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self-reported health than those who were continuously privately insured, but there was no 
significant difference in the probability of developing a new mobility difficulty. There were 
no significant differences, for either outcome, between those who transitioned to public 
health insurance compared to those who were continuously privately insured. 
Kasper, Giovannini and Hoffman (2000) examined the effect of gaining or losing insurance 
on the probability of reporting fair or poor health. They found no statistically significant 
relationship between changes in insurance coverage and changes in health. However, their 
model did not control for potentially time-varying omitted variables. In addition, they 
suggest that their dependent variable is likely to be sensitive only to large, serious changes 
in health. Therefore, they could not rule out the possibility that insurance coverage was 
associated with smaller, but meaningful, changes in health outcomes. 
McMorrow et al. (2016) evaluated the effect of changes in Medicaid income eligibility 
thresholds on mental health in poor US adults. Mental health was measured with Kessler 
psychological distress risk categories (see Section 4.2.5). Controlling for socioeconomic 
characteristics and local economic and health variables, they found that an increase in the 
income threshold in the previous year (resulting in more people becoming eligible for 
Medicaid) was associated with small improvements in psychological distress. 
Although these longitudinal studies are superior to purely cross-sectional designs, several 
limitations remain. Changes in insurance status may be correlated with time-varying omitted 
variables, which are often ignored or imperfectly controlled for. In addition, many papers in 
this literature use data from the Health and Retirement Study, whose participants were near-
elderly (aged 51-61 years) at baseline. The effect for other age groups may differ. 
3.2.4.1 Fixed effects 
Several papers have used fixed effects (FE) models to control for time-invariant individual 
heterogeneity which may be correlated with both insurance status and health outcomes 
(Dave & Kaestner 2009; DeLeire 2019; Lei & Lin 2009; Quesnel-Vallee 2004). Pan, Lei 
and Liu (2016) estimated OLS, fixed effects and instrumental variables models to examine 
the effect of a basic government health insurance program in China. Data came from the 
Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance Survey, a panel survey. The dependent variable 
was self-reported health status, measured from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good). This was 
operationalised as a linear five-point variable, and as a dummy variable indicating whether 
the individual’s health was good or very good. Health insurance was also measured as a 
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dummy variable indicating whether the individual was enrolled in the government health 
insurance program.  
The OLS estimates suggested that insurance negatively affected both measures of health 
status, even after controlling for demographic and economic characteristics, and drinking 
and smoking behaviours. By contrast, the FE estimates were smaller and no longer 
statistically significant for either outcome.  However, when Pan et al. used cross-city 
variation in government insurance subsidies to instrument for insurance status, they found 
that health insurance positively affected both measures of self-rated health. The difference 
between the OLS, fixed effects and instrumental variables estimates is consistent with the 
presence of omitted variables and adverse selection. The FE estimates were less biased than 
the OLS estimates (due to the removal of time-invariant individual heterogeneity) but were 
still biased by time-varying omitted variables or reverse causality, which the IV model 
removed. 
Jacobs, Hill and Burdette (2014) used a FE model to examine the effect of health insurance 
on psychological distress among low-income urban women with children. Three dimensions 
of psychological distress were measured: depression, anxiety, and somatisation. Insurance 
status was defined as any health insurance coverage, PHI coverage, or public health 
insurance coverage. They also controlled for time-varying variables, including demographic 
and economic variables and self-rated physical health. The authors found no evidence that 
insurance status significantly affected any of the psychological distress measures, with the 
exception of public insurance, which was associated with a statistically significant increase 
in anxiety. However, the applicability of the study may be limited due to the non-
representative population examined and small sample size (2,402 women). In this thesis, the 
much larger, nationally representative HILDA dataset is used, addressing some of these 
sample concerns. 
3.2.5 Australian literature 
No Australian studies that examined the relationship between PHI and health status were 
identified. However, the effect of PHI on health care utilisation in Australia has been studied. 
Individuals with insurance are more likely to be treated in private hospitals than the 
uninsured (Doiron & Kettlewell 2018; Lu & Savage 2006; Srivastava & Zhao 2008). Private 
hospitals typically have shorter waiting times than public hospitals (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 2017). Even private patients in the public system have shorter waiting 
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times for all procedures, regardless of urgency category, though the effect is especially large 
for less urgent procedures (Johar & Savage 2010; Shmueli & Savage 2014).  
However, the relationship between PHI status and private hospital use may be heterogeneous 
across the insured population. Lu and Savage (2006), using propensity score matching to 
address the endogeneity of PHI status, found that individuals who had been insured for 
shorter periods of time were less likely to use the private system than the long-term insured. 
Similarly, Viney, Savage and Fiebig (2006), reported that, controlling for demographic 
variables and health status, individuals whose purchase of PHI was motivated by a desire 
for physician choice, concern about waiting lists, or health concerns were more likely to 
seek treatment as a private patient than those whose purchase was financially motivated (for 
example, to avoid the MLS). 
Eldridge et al. (2017), using the same instruments used in the empirical analysis in this 
thesis, reported that the increase in private hospital use among PHI holders was mostly 
attributable to substitution away from public hospitals, rather than an overall increase in 
hospital use. Cheng (2014) reached a similar conclusion. However, other papers have linked 
PHI to net increases in hospital use, measured as number of admissions and length of stay 
(Doiron & Kettlewell 2018; Lu & Savage 2006; Meng et al. 2017). Doiron, Fiebig and 
Suziedelyte (2014) estimated the effect of PHI on the probability of receiving surgery in 
older residents of New South Wales. Controlling for health, risk behaviours, socioeconomic 
status and demographic variables, they found that PHI was associated with a large increase 
in the probability of receiving elective surgery, but there was no significant effect on urgent, 
non-elective surgery. This greater effect for more discretionary elective procedures provided 
some evidence that moral hazard, rather than adverse selection, was driving the increase in 
utilisation. Similarly, Shmueli and Savage (2014) found that PHI was associated with greater 
treatment intensity in hospital. Controlling for demographic, socioeconomic and clinical 
characteristics, private patients in public hospitals received more procedures while in 
hospital and spent more time in intensive care, although they found no effect on the duration 
of stay. 
Fewer studies have examined the causal effect of PHI on utilisation of services covered by 
ancillaries insurance. Such services, since typically more discretionary than hospital 
procedures, may be associated with an even larger moral hazard effect. Kettlewell (2018) 
instrumented private ancillaries insurance with an indicator for whether an individual wore 
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glasses or contact lenses. He found that PHI increased utilisation of dental, physiotherapy, 
osteopathy, chiropractic and acupuncture services, and weaker evidence for a positive effect 
on mental health and naturopathy services. Hopkins, Kidd and Ulker (2013) and Srivastava, 
Chen and Harris (2017) also observed that PHI was associated with greater use of dental 
services. 
3.3 Summary of literature review 
A range of methodological approaches have been used in the literature to examine the effect 
of health insurance on health status. Overall, the results are mixed. Although many studies 
report that insurance positively affects physical and mental health, the finding is not 
universal, and reports of null effects are also common. Contextual and methodological 
differences may explain this variation. It is likely that the effect of PHI varies across 
populations, depending on the characteristics of individuals as well as the institutional 
setting. In addition, studies which do not fully account for the endogeneity of PHI may report 
biased estimates of the true effect. These issues highlight the contribution of this thesis to 
the literature. Firstly, the empirical analysis examines the effect of PHI in a novel 
institutional setting, with a comprehensive public health care system. Secondly, it examines 
whether the effects of PHI vary by demographic characteristics or health needs. Finally, it 
uses several methodological approaches to estimate the causal effect of PHI. All of these 
analyses may help to contextualise and reconcile the differing findings in the literature. 
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4 Data description 
4.1 HILDA 
The data source for this thesis consists of waves 12 to 17 of the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey (Summerfield et al. 2019). HILDA is an 
annual longitudinal survey funded by the Australian Government Department of Social 
Services and administered by the Melbourne Institute for Applied Economic & Social 
Research. The survey comprises an in-person interview and self-completion questionnaire. 
Interviews are typically conducted from July to December of the wave year, with the 
majority (approximately 80%) conducted in August or September. 
HILDA began in 2001 with a sample of 7,682 Australian households, comprising 19,914 
individuals. The sample was intended to be representative of the Australian population, 
except those living in remote regions and public institutions (Watson & Wooden 2002). A 
top-up sample of 5,462 individuals across 2,153 households was added in wave 11. All 
original or top-up sample members, their children, and new household members who have 
a child with a sample member, are pursued in each wave. Other new household members 
are followed as long as they share a household with an original sample member. In wave 17, 
63.7% of the original wave 1 sample, and 78.6% of the original wave 11 sample, were 
interviewed. 
4.1.1 Variables 
A core set of social, health and economic questions are asked in each wave of the HILDA 
survey. In addition, there are a series of rotating modules which are asked at regular 
intervals. Most relevant for this thesis is the health module, which includes detailed 
questions on private health insurance coverage, health status and health care utilisation. This 
module was included in waves 9, 13, and 17. A one-off private health insurance module was 
included in wave 4. 
The key independent variable for this thesis is a binary indicator of PHI coverage status. The 
dependent variables are various measures of physical and mental health status: self-assessed 
health status, standardised Short Form 36 (SF-36) physical and mental health scores and the 
Kessler psychological distress score. Further detail is provided below. 
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4.1.2 Sample selection 
Overall, the dataset comprises 341,170 observations on 41,749 individuals over seventeen 
waves (the panel is unbalanced, so not every individual was observed in every wave). The 
primary measure of PHI was only available in waves 12 to 17, reducing the potential sample 
to 139,816 observations (29,622 individuals). Children aged under 18 years of age were 
excluded, reducing the potential sample to 105,961 observations (22,827 persons). 5,934 
observations which were missing the key PHI status measure were excluded, leaving a 
potential sample of 100,027 observations. Observations which lacked data on the control 
variables (see Section 4.2.6) were then excluded, reducing the sample to 78,777 observations 
on 18,003 individuals.  
Observations lacking data on the key health measures were excluded. The measures differed 
in their response rates. For self-assessed health, the final sample was 78,160 observations 
on 17,976 individuals. For the SF-36 physical and mental health scores, the final sample was 
77,323 observations on 17,905 individuals. The Kessler psychological distress measure was 
only included in waves 13, 15 and 17. The final sample for this variable was 39,589 
observations on 16,865 individuals.  
4.2 Variable definitions 
4.2.1 PHI 
HILDA measures PHI status in several ways. The first is a binary indicator of private 
hospital coverage. In waves 12 to 17, individuals were asked “Were you covered by private 
patient hospital cover for the whole of the last financial year?” An alternative measure is 
available in waves 4, 9, 13 and 17. In these waves, individuals were asked if they were 
currently covered by private hospital cover, extras cover, or both. Summary statistics for 
both measures are reported in Table 4. 
TABLE 4: Private health insurance coverage rates 
 Proportion of sample 
covered 
Private hospital coverage rate – last financial year 54.96% 
Currently covered by private hospital cover 54.25% 
Currently covered by private extras cover 52.36% 
Currently covered by private hospital cover only 6.32% 
Currently covered by private extras cover only 4.43% 
Currently covered by both private hospital and extras cover 47.93% 
The sample used is the sample available for analysis with SF-36 scores, N =77,323. 
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Private hospital coverage in the last financial year is the primary measure of PHI status in 
this thesis. Although this restricts the analysis to the effect of hospital cover only, this 
variable has several advantages. Firstly, there are more observations for each individual (six 
waves as opposed to four). Secondly, the HILDA interviews are conducted in the second 
half of the calendar year, and the PHI question measures coverage for the whole of the 
previous financial year, which ends in June. This means that individuals answering “yes” 
are, at the time of the interview and measurement of health status, beyond the PHI waiting 
period (two months for most services, twelve months for obstetrics and pre-existing 
conditions) and able to access the benefits of their insurance (and, in most cases, will have 
been able to do so for some time).  
The focus on hospital insurance does not entail a great loss in the policy relevance of the 
empirical findings. Two of the three federal government policies directed at increasing PHI 
coverage (LHC and MLS) apply to hospital coverage only, although rebates apply to both 
hospital and ancillaries cover. In addition, private hospital cover accounts for the majority 
of the value of benefits paid by private health insurers (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare 2018). Most previous research on PHI in Australia has focussed on hospital 
coverage (Eldridge et al. 2017; Savage & Wright 2003).  
4.2.2 Household PHI expenditure 
In waves 5-17, respondents with responsibility for paying household bills estimated the 
household’s annual PHI expenditure. This measure was used as a robustness check. 
Household expenditure on PHI is a proxy for comprehensiveness of insurance coverage. If 
only more comprehensive PHI plans affect health, the binary PHI status indicator might fail 
to detect an effect, whereas the level of expenditure could.  
This variable is subject to several sources of measurement error. Reported household 
expenditure is imperfectly correlated with individual PHI expenditure, especially for 
households containing multiple families. Such households might differ in unobservable 
ways from single-family households. Further, some households claim the PHI rebate as a 
reduction in the premium paid to their insurer, whereas others receive the rebate in their tax 
return (Australian Taxation Office 2019c). The data does not distinguish whether the 
expenditure estimate is net of the government rebate. This decision is potentially correlated 
with socioeconomic status or other unobserved characteristics. 
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Finally, holding the comprehensiveness of the insurance coverage constant, there is likely 
to be variation in insurance costs, as some policies are more expensive than others. Such 
variation could be correlated with an individual’s financial literacy, family background, 
socioeconomic status or other unobserved characteristics.  
Given these issues, expenditure on PHI is used as a robustness check rather than the main 
measure of PHI coverage. The variable is adjusted for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 
reported in real 2012 dollars. Table 5 reports summary statistics. 
TABLE 5: Summary statistics for household expenditure on PHI, for sample available 
for analysis with SF-36 scores 
N Mean ($) Standard 
deviation ($) 
Minimum ($) Maximum ($) 
Full sample 
73,312 1435.73 1631.55 0 36000 
Only individuals with positive household PHI Expenditure 
45,871 2294.61 1511.15 0.98 36000 
 
4.2.3 Self-assessed health 
Self-assessed health is measured by the question “In general, would you say your health is: 
excellent, very good, good, fair or poor.” Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses. Most 
individuals report good or very good health, and very few (3.18%) report poor health.  
As discussed in Section 5.2, self-assessed health is sometimes operationalised as a dummy 
variable indicating very good or excellent health; or a dummy variable indicating poor or 
fair health. Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 6. 
TABLE 6: Summary statistics for dummy self-assessed health variables (N = 78,160) 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Self-assessed health very 
good or excellent 
0.459 0.498 0 1 
Self-assessed health fair or 
poor 
0.174 0.379 0 1 
 
Self-assessed health has been commonly used as a dependent variable in the literature. The 
variable has been shown to be a strong and independent predictor of morbidity and mortality 
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(DeSalvo et al. 2006; Idler & Benyamini 1997), although the association varies with 
socioeconomic status (Dowd & Zajacova 2010). 
Figure 2: Distribution of responses to self-assessed health variable 
  
4.2.4 Short Form-36 health variables 
The 36-Item Short Form Health Survey (SF-36), an established 36-item instrument for 
assessing physical and mental health (Ware et al. 2000), is included in the Self-Completion 
Questionnaire every wave. A summary of the questions is included in Appendix A. The 
individual items are used to calculate eight scales, which can be summarised into a physical 
health component (PHC) score and a mental health component (MHC) score (Ware, 
Kosinski & Keller 1994). Higher scores indicate better health. 
The procedure for calculating the summary scores is as follows. First, each scale was 
standardised against published norms for the Australian population  according to the 
formula: 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 =
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 − 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
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Then, the physical and mental health component scores were calculated as the weighted sum 
of the eight standardised scales, using weights derived from principal component analysis 
of the 1995 National Health Survey (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1995), which are the 
standard in applied Australian work. Finally, the component scores were scaled to have a 
mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 in the population. 
Table 7 reports the weights and summary statistics for the SF-36 scales and summary scores. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of the summary indices. 
 
TABLE 7: Weights (from ABS 1995) and summary statistics for SF-36 scales and 
summary scores, in the sample used for analysis (N=77,323) 
 Weight 
for PHC 
Weight 
for MHC 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Physical 
functioning 
0.473 -0.244 83.234 23.211 0 100 
Role – 
physical  
0.382 -0.134 77.937 36.856 0 100 
Bodily pain 0.368 -0.124 71.985 23.941 0 100 
General 
health 
0.190 0.053 67.378 20.904 0 100 
Vitality -0.019 0.271 59.308 20.031 0 100 
Social 
functioning 
-0.013 0.265 82.472 23.580 0 100 
Role – 
emotional 
-0.150 0.359 82.920 33.213 0 100 
Mental 
health 
-0.271 0.488 74.270 17.279 0 100 
Physical 
health 
component 
score 
  48.899 10.518 4.984 76.318 
Mental 
health 
component 
score 
  48.710 10.575 -1.804 74.920 
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Figure 3: Distribution of SF-36 physical health component in available sample 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of SF-36 mental health component in available sample 
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4.2.5 Kessler Psychological Distress 
The 10-item Kessler Psychological Distress Scale is designed to measure psychological 
distress and depressive symptoms in the four weeks prior to the interview (Wooden 2009). 
It is particularly sensitive to high levels of psychological distress, and is effective in 
detecting serious mental disorders (Kessler et al. 2003). The items contributing to the scale 
are reported in Appendix B. Table 8 reports summary statistics, and Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of the Kessler score. Higher scores indicate greater distress. 
TABLE 8: Summary statistics for Kessler score, in the sample used for analysis 
(N = 39,589) 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
15.881 6.534 10 50 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of Kessler score in available sample 
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4.2.6 Controls 
Table 9 reports definitions and summary statistics for control variables. The control 
variables were chosen with reference to the literature. PHI and health status are both likely 
to be correlated with demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, so models control for 
gender, age, family structure, income, education and employment status. The smoking, 
exercise, and willingness to take financial risks variables are intended to capture sources of 
advantageous selection such as risk aversion and concern for health (Buchmueller et al. 
2013; Fang et al. 2008; Finkelstein & McGarry 2006). The variable measuring prior health 
expectations is intended to capture adverse selection (Finkelstein & McGarry 2006).  
Income is defined as family income for Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS) purposes in the 
previous financial year (for example, for wave 12, the 2011-12 financial year). This 
definition was chosen for consistency with the MLS instrument used in the instrumental 
variable analysis. The HILDA tax benefit model was used to calculate the variable (Hahn & 
Wilkins 2018). The model uses imputed values of income as inputs. Details of the imputation 
procedure are provided in Hayes and Watson (2009).  
MLS income is defined as the sum of taxable income, superannuation benefits, salary 
sacrificed income and rental income loss. Family income for MLS purposes was defined as 
the sum of an individual’s own and, if present, their spouse’s income. Dependent students 
are considered to have their parents’ family income, but their own income does not 
contribute toward their parents’ family income value. 
The income variable was then transformed into real values using the CPI (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2019). The base year was the 2011-12 financial year. 
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TABLE 9: Summary statistics for control variables, for sample available for analysis with 
SF-36 scores (N = 77,323) 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Basic demographic variables 
Male Dummy variable = 1 if 
individual is male 
0.465 0.499 0 1 
Age Age at 30 June of wave 
year 
47.237 17.803 18 100 
Partner age Partner’s age at 30 June 
of wave year if partner 
present in household  
N = 51,947 
48.757 15.892 16 101 
Parent cover Dummy variable = 1 if 
individual is under 21 
years, or under 25 and a 
dependent student 
0.0698 0.255 0 1 
Lives in rural 
area 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
section of state 
classified as ‘rural 
balance’  (ABS 2011)   
0.0996 0.299 0 1 
Family structure 
Has partner Dummy variable = 1 if 
partner present in 
household 
0.672 0.470 0 1 
Has children Dummy variable = 1 if 
number of dependent 
children > 0  
0.333 0.471 0 1 
Single Dummy variable = 1 if 
individual is single for 
Medicare Levy 
Surcharge purposes, i.e. 
no partner in the 
household and no 
dependent children 
0.291 0.454 0 1 
Socioeconomic status 
Family 
income 
Family income for MLS 
purposes, $1000 2012 
dollars  
85.375 92.322 0 2687962 
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Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Education Highest education level 
achieved: 
[1] Bachelor’s degree or 
postgraduate 
[2] Year 12, Certificate 
III or IV, or diploma 
[3] Year 11 and below 
[1] Bachelor’s or higher = 28.02% 
[2] Year 12 or diploma = 48.86% 
[3] Year 11 and below = 23.12% 
Employment 
status 
[1] Employed 
[2] Unemployed 
[3] Not in the labour 
force 
[1] Employed = 64.84% 
[2] Unemployed = 3.23% 
[3] Not in the labour force = 31.93% 
Adverse and advantageous selection 
Current 
smoker 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
individual currently 
smokes cigarettes or 
other tobacco products 
0.168 0.374 0 1 
Regularly 
exercises 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
individual exercises at 
least three times per 
week 
0.488 0.500 0 1 
Take any 
financial risk 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
individual willing to 
take any financial risk 
with spare cash used for 
savings or investment 
0.498 0.5 0 1 
L.expect 
worse health 
One period lag of 
dummy variable = 1 if 
individual reports that 
they expect health to 
get worse 
0.176 0.381 0 1 
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4.3 Correlation with PHI 
Table 10 reports the correlations between PHI and each of the other variables. PHI is 
positively correlated (p-value < 0.05) with each of the measures of health status (or 
negatively correlated with Kessler score, indicating lower psychological distress) and with 
most of the socioeconomic and advantageous selection variables. 
TABLE 10: Correlation between PHI and other variables, for sample 
available for analysis with SF-36 scores (N = 77,323) 
 Correlation with PHI 
Self-assessed health 0.1259*** 
SF-36 physical health component 0.0784*** 
SF-36 mental health component 0.1302*** 
Kessler score -0.1718*** 
Male -0.0066* 
Age 0.1168*** 
Partner age 0.1692*** 
Parent cover -0.0502*** 
Rural status -0.0233*** 
Has partner 0.1497*** 
Has kids 0.0008 
Family income 0.3098*** 
Current smoker -0.2276*** 
Regularly exercises 0.0566*** 
Willing to take any financial risk 0.2184*** 
L.expect worse health -0.0117*** 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
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5 Econometric framework 
The primary dependent variables are self-assessed health, SF-36 mental health score, SF-36 
physical health score, and Kessler psychological distress score. The SF-36 and the Kessler 
scores are continuous variables which, despite their skew, are typically estimated with linear 
models in the literature (Alang, McAlpine & Henning-Smith 2014; Baicker et al. 2013; 
Miller & Wherry 2018; Probst et al. 2008; Weathers & Stegman 2012). However, self-
assessed health is an ordinal variable. Alternative estimators which account for the nature of 
this dependent variable are considered below. 
5.1 Models for continuous variables 
The basic model is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a measure of health status for individual i in wave t, 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a binary indicator 
of PHI coverage status, 𝐗𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables, and 𝛼𝑖 is unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. Interest lies in estimating 𝛽1, which is the average difference in health 
outcome between those with and without PHI. The null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0, that PHI has 
no effect on health status, will be rejected if the p-value for 𝛽1 is less than 0.05. 
If 𝐗𝑖𝑡 omits variables which are correlated with both 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 and 𝑌𝑖𝑡, the estimated 𝛽1, ?̂?1, will 
be subject to omitted variable bias (Angrist & Pischke 2009a). For example, if 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 is 
omitted, the expected value of ?̂?1will be biased according to the formula: 
𝔼[?̂?1| 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡] = 𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑘  ×
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡)
 
In other words, the omitted variable bias is proportional to the correlation between health 
status and the omitted variable, and the correlation between PHI and the omitted variable 
(through 𝛽𝑘). In the insurance context, positive omitted variable bias can be interpreted as 
indicating that the omitted variable is a source of advantageous selection (positively 
correlated with both PHI and health), whereas negative omitted variable bias implies that 
the omitted variable is a source of adverse selection (positively correlated with PHI and 
negatively correlated with health, or the reverse) (Fang et al. 2008). 
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The most appropriate estimator for (1) depends on the assumption made about 𝛼𝑖 (Cameron 
& Trivedi 2005). There are two alternatives: 
1. Random effects (RE) assumption: 𝛼𝑖~(𝛼, 𝜎𝛼
2) and is independent of the regressors; 
or 
2. Fixed effects (FE) assumption: 𝛼𝑖 is potentially correlated with the regressors. 
In both cases, strict exogeneity of the idiosyncratic error 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is assumed: 
𝔼[𝜖𝑖𝑡|𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, … , 𝐗𝑖𝑇 , 𝛼𝑖] = 0 
5.1.1.1 Estimators under RE assumption 
Under the RE assumption, (1) can be rewritten as  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐗𝒊𝒕
′ 𝛃 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (1𝑎) 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≡ (𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the composite error term. 
(1a) can be estimated by pooled ordinary least squares (POLS). This estimator treats the 
dataset as a cross-section and applies ordinary least squares to the pooled observations. The 
POLS estimator of 𝛽1 is consistent if there is no correlation between the regressors and the 
composite error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡. Strict exogeneity and the RE assumption are sufficient to guarantee 
this. In this model, this implies that unobserved individual factors which affect health status 
are uncorrelated with PHI status. 
Even under this assumption, conventional POLS standard errors are incorrect. The default 
errors ignore the fact that, due to the presence of 𝛼𝑖 in 𝑢𝑖𝑡, there is serial correlation in each 
individual’s composite errors over time (Wooldridge 2010). Thus, panel-robust standard 
errors, which account for this clustering within individuals and heteroscedasticity, are used 
for all POLS models. 
The Gauss-Markov theorem states that POLS is BLUE (the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) 
when, among other conditions, there is no correlation in 𝑢𝑖𝑡. Under the RE assumption, a 
necessary condition for this to be true is 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛼𝑖) = 𝜎𝛼
2 = 0; that is, there is a constant 
intercept for all individuals. Outside this restrictive case, there is a more efficient estimator 
available: the random effects (RE) estimator. The RE estimator uses feasible generalised 
least squares to exploit the correlation structure of the errors, resulting in more efficient 
estimation than POLS. However, this efficiency gain comes at the cost of additional 
assumptions necessary for consistency: RE is consistent only under strict exogeneity, 
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whereas POLS is consistent under the weaker assumption 𝔼[𝜖𝑖𝑡|𝐗𝑖𝑡] = 0 (Wooldridge 
2010). 
5.1.1.2 Estimators under FE assumption 
Under the FE assumption, the POLS and RE estimators are inconsistent, and 𝛽1 cannot be 
directly estimated from (1). In the case of a short panel like HILDA, with a large number of 
units and relatively few time periods, the 𝛼𝑖 cannot be consistently estimated: there are few 
observations relative to the number of parameters to be estimated. This is known as the 
incidental parameters problem. However, (1) can be transformed to remove the 𝛼𝑖 and 
consistently estimate 𝛽1. 
One option is the first differences transformation. This involves subtracting the lag of (1) 
from (1): 
(𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) = 𝛽1(𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡−1) + (𝐗𝑖𝑡 − 𝐗𝑖𝑡−1)
′𝛃 + (𝜖𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖𝑖𝑡−1) (1𝑐) 
An alternative approach is to subtract the within-individual mean of (1) from (1). This is 
known as the FE model: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌?̅? = 𝛽1(𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + (𝐗𝑖𝑡 − 𝐗𝑖̅̅̅)
′𝛃 + (𝜖𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖?̅?) (1𝑑) 
which can be written more compactly as: 
?̃?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼̃ 𝑖𝑡 + ?̃?𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛃 + 𝜖?̃?𝑡 (1𝑒) 
Note that 𝛼𝑖 does not appear in (1c) or (1e) because it is constant over time. OLS estimation 
of (1c) and (1e) gives a consistent estimate of 𝛽1. The relative efficiency of the estimators 
depends on the assumption made about the idiosyncratic error term. If the 𝜖𝑖𝑡 are 
homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated, the FE estimator is more efficient. However, if 
there is substantial serial dependence in the 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (for example, if they follow a random walk), 
the FD estimator is more efficient. These assumptions can be tested (see Appendix E). 
Both the FD and FE estimators have several limitations. They do not remove bias resulting 
from time-varying omitted variables, cannot estimate the coefficients on time-invariant 
regressors, and rely on variation in PHI status within individuals over time for identification.  
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5.1.1.3 Distinguishing between FE and RE assumptions 
Conceptually, the FE assumption is more plausible in the context of examining PHI and 
health status. Health status is influenced by many stable individual factors, such as family 
background, genetics, socioeconomic status, cognitive ability, time preference, risk 
aversion, and trust in health care institutions, among others. These factors are imperfectly 
measured in HILDA, and thus form part of 𝛼𝑖. However, many of these factors are also 
likely to be correlated with PHI (Doiron et al. 2008). This violates the RE assumption. 
The Hausman test can be used to formally test the RE assumption. The FE model is 
consistent under both the RE and FE assumptions, whereas the RE model is only consistent 
under the RE assumption (that is, if 𝛼𝑖 is uncorrelated with the regressors). Hence, a 
difference between the FE and RE coefficients implies that the RE assumption is invalid. 
The Hausman test is used to assess the statistical significance of this difference. If the 
coefficients are similar, the RE model is typically preferred, because it is more efficient 
(Wooldridge 2010). A robust version of the Hausman test, which accounts for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering in the standard errors (Wooldridge 2010, p. 332) will be 
used in this thesis. 
5.2 Models for self-assessed health 
Self-assessed health is an ordinal variable. The categories of self-assessed health can be 
ranked (excellent is better than very good, and so on), but the distances between the values 
do not have a clear meaning: for example, the difference between poor and fair health is not 
necessarily the same as the difference between very good and excellent health. Therefore, 
linear regression models, which assume that each regressor has a constant marginal effect, 
may not be the appropriate. Ordered probit or logit models, which reflect the ordinal nature 
of the dependent variable, are typically preferred (Greene 2002, p. 736). However, these 
models cannot account for individual fixed effects, and are therefore biased if unobserved 
individual heterogeneity is present in the data and correlated with the regressors. 
There are several possible estimation strategies in this case of an ordered response variable 
with fixed effects. The first option is to ignore the fixed effects and estimate an ordered logit 
or probit model. Alternatively, the ordinal nature of the data can be ignored, and a linear 
fixed effects model estimated. Finally, the dependent variable can be dichotomised (either 
with a predetermined meaningful threshold, or a threshold derived from the data) and a fixed 
effects logit estimator applied. 
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Riedl and Geishecker (2014) compared the finite sample performance of these estimators. 
They found that for sufficiently large samples, the simple fixed effects logit estimator 
performs well. This estimator involves dichotomising the ordinal variable by applying a 
predetermined meaningful threshold and then applying the fixed effects logit model (also 
known as the conditional logit model). 
Dichotomisation of self-assessed health is the most common approach in the literature. The 
most frequent threshold choice is an indicator for whether health is very good or excellent 
(Baker et al. 2002; Barbaresco et al. 2015; Card, Dobkin & Maestas 2004; Miller & Wherry 
2017; Pan et al. 2016; Sommers et al. 2017b). Another common threshold choice is whether 
health is fair or poor (Lei & Lin 2009; Pauly 2005; Sommers et al. 2017b).  
Most authors then estimate a linear probability model (Barbaresco et al. 2015; Card et al. 
2004; De La Mata 2012; Pauly 2005; Shigeoka 2014), although logit and probit models have 
also been used (Courtemanche & Zapata 2014; Lei & Lin 2009).  
Thus, following Riedl and Geishecker (2014) and the broader literature, in this thesis self-
assessed health will be operationalised as a binary variable, equal to one if self-assessed 
health is very good or excellent, and zero otherwise (self-assessed is health poor, fair or 
good). As a robustness check, results from an alternative specification (dummy variable 
equal to one if self-assessed health is poor or fair) are reported in Appendix Table G1. 
The self-assessed health model will be first estimated with a linear probability model, for 
simplicity of interpretation, comparability with the existing literature, and consistency with 
the linear models used for the other dependent variables. A conditional logit estimator will 
also be estimated as a robustness check (Appendix Table G1). 
5.2.1 Conditional logit model 
The conditional logit model is motivated by assuming the existence of an unobserved latent 
variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , in this case general health status, which can be modelled as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (2𝑎) 
where 𝛼𝑖 may be correlated with the regressors. 
However, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is not observed; instead, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, self-assessed heath, is measured with five ordered 
categories: poor (1), fair (2), good (3), very good (4) or excellent (5). 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is related to 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  in 
the following way: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 
1 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇1
𝑖
2 if 𝜇1
𝑖 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇2
𝑖
3 if 𝜇2
𝑖 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇3
𝑖
4 if 𝜇3
𝑖 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇4
𝑖
5 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 𝜇4
𝑖
 
In other words, an individual reports health in category k if their latent health status passes 
some, potentially individual-specific, unobserved threshold 𝜇𝑘
𝑖 . 
The probability of observing response k is: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘|𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝐗𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖) = F(𝜇𝑘 − 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽) − F(𝜇𝑘−1 − 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽) (2𝑏) 
where 𝐹(∙) is a cumulative distribution function.  
In the absence of individual effects 𝛼𝑖, an ordered probit (if 𝜖𝑖𝑡 follows a normal distribution) 
or ordered logit (if 𝜖𝑖𝑡 follows a logistic distribution) model could be estimated via maximum 
likelihood. However, the presence of 𝛼𝑖 leads to the incidental parameters problem and can 
bias estimates of 𝛽1 (Greene 2004). 
The simple conditional logit model dichotomises 𝑦𝑖𝑡 by applying a meaningful threshold 𝑌 
such that: 
𝑏𝑖𝑡 = {
0 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑌
1 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡 > 𝑌
  
This transformed variable is then used as the dependent variable in a conditional logit model 
(Chamberlain 1980). The conditional logit model eliminates 𝛼𝑖 by conditioning on the total 
number of time periods for which an individual’s response 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is equal to one.
3 This leads to 
unbiased estimates of 𝛽, although standard errors can be large because identification comes 
only from individuals who change their state over time. 
  
                                                 
3 It is a unique feature of the logistic function that the 𝛼𝑖 can be conditioned out in this way. The same does 
not apply to the probit model. 
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The conditioning property can be easily demonstrated when 𝑇 = 2. Define 𝜂𝑖 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  ; 
that is, 𝜂𝑖 is the number of time periods in which the individual’s response is equal to one. 
For notational simplicity, let 𝐗𝑖𝑡 subsume 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡, and consider the case when 𝜂𝑖 = 1 
(Wooldridge 2010): 
Pr(𝑦𝑖2 = 1 | 𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, 𝛼𝑖 , 𝜂𝑖 = 1) =
Pr (𝑦𝑖2 = 1, 𝜂𝑖 = 1|𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, 𝛼𝑖)
Pr (𝜂𝑖 = 1|𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, 𝛼𝑖)
 
=
Pr(𝑦𝑖2 = 1|𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, 𝛼𝑖) × Pr (𝑦𝑖1 = 0|𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, 𝛼𝑖)
Pr(𝑦𝑖1 = 0, 𝑦𝑖2 = 1|𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, 𝛼𝑖) + Pr (𝑦𝑖1 = 1, 𝑦𝑖2 = 0|𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, 𝛼𝑖)
  
=
exp (𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
1 + exp (𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
×
1
1 + exp (𝐗𝑖1
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
exp (𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
1 + exp (𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
×
1
1 + exp (𝐗𝑖1
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
+
exp (𝐗𝑖1
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
1 + exp (𝐗𝑖1
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
×
1
1 + exp (𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
 
=
exp (𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
exp(𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖) + exp (𝐗𝑖1
′ 𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖)
 
=
exp(𝛼𝑖) exp(𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃)
exp(𝛼𝑖) [exp(𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃) + exp(𝐗𝑖1
′ 𝛃)]
 
=
exp(𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃)
[exp(𝐗𝑖2
′ 𝛃) + exp(𝐗𝑖1
′ 𝛃)]
 
=
exp((𝐗𝑖2 − 𝐗𝑖1)
′𝛃)
1 + exp((𝐗𝑖2 − 𝐗𝑖1)′𝛃)
 
=
exp(Δ𝐗𝑖
′𝛃)
1 + exp(Δ𝐗𝑖
′𝛃)
 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖1 = 1 | 𝐗𝑖1, 𝐗𝑖2, 𝛼𝑖 , 𝜂𝑖 = 1) can be derived in a similar way. The key result is that this 
conditional probability is independent of 𝛼𝑖; thus, the conditional log likelihood function be 
formed and 𝛽 consistently estimated through maximum likelihood estimation.  
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5.3 IV Model 
The FE model eliminates the bias associated with unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
However, there may be time-varying omitted variables or reverse causality, leading to 
correlation between the idiosyncratic error 𝜖𝑖𝑡 and the regressors. In this case, the FE 
estimates are biased. 
Thus, in order to relax the assumption of no correlation between 𝜖𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡, an 
instrumental variable model was estimated. (Note that the control variables 𝐗𝑖𝑡 are assumed 
to be exogenous throughout this section.) Following Eldridge et al. (2017), two instruments 
relating to federal government incentives for PHI purchase were used: 
1. Over 31, an indicator for whether an individual is over 31 as at 30 June of the wave 
year and therefore subject to Lifetime Health Cover (LHC) loading; 
2. Over MLS, an indicator for whether an individual’s income is over the relevant 
Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS) threshold for that wave. 
The LHC and MLS policies are outlined in Section 2.4. As will be argued below, these 
instruments are plausibly exogenous and should induce higher take-up of PHI.  
5.3.1 FE-IV Model 
As before, the panel data model is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛃 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Now, 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be endogenous: potentially correlated with both 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜖𝑖𝑡. Hence, 
even the fixed effects estimate of 𝛽1 from application of OLS to (1e) is biased and 
inconsistent, because the within-transformed 𝑃𝐻𝐼̃ 𝑖𝑡is correlated with the within-transformed 
idiosyncratic error 𝜖?̃?𝑡. 
Assume that there exists a vector 𝐙𝑖𝑡 of instruments satisfying 𝔼[𝜖𝑖𝑡|𝐙𝑖𝑡] = 0 (Wooldridge 
2010). 𝐙𝑖𝑡 includes the exogenous variables 𝐗𝑖𝑡 as well as at least one excluded instrument. 
If it is also assumed that 𝔼[𝛼𝑖|𝐙𝑖1, … , 𝐙𝑖𝑇] = 𝔼[𝛼𝑖] = 0, the random effects instrumental 
variables estimator could be used. However, this assumption is unlikely to hold. The 
Hausman test in Section 6.1.2 rejected the null hypothesis of no correlation between 𝛼𝑖 and 
the included regressors. In particular, since 𝐗𝑖𝑡 contains variables such as education and 
income, it is likely to be correlated with unobserved factors such as family background 
which are part of 𝛼𝑖. 
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Therefore, the fixed effects instrumental variables (FE-IV) estimator will be used. This 
estimator is consistent under the assumption 𝔼[𝜖𝑖𝑡|𝐙𝑖1, … , 𝐙𝑖𝑇 , 𝛼𝑖] = 0, that is, strict 
exogeneity of the instruments, conditional on 𝛼𝑖. 
The FE-IV estimator is implemented by applying pooled two stage least squares (2SLS) to 
the within-transformed model (1e) using time-demeaned instruments ?̃?𝑖𝑡 = 𝐙𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡. The 
logic of 2SLS is as follows (Angrist & Pischke 2009a). In the first stage, the endogenous 
variable 𝑃𝐻𝐼̃ 𝑖𝑡 is regressed on  ?̃?𝑖𝑡. In the second stage, the predicted values from this 
regression, which capture the exogenous variation in 𝑃𝐻𝐼̃ 𝑖𝑡, replace 𝑃𝐻𝐼̃ 𝑖𝑡 in equation (1e), 
which is estimated by OLS. In practice, the steps are combined in Stata in order to obtain 
correct standard errors. 
The FE-IV estimator has been used in the literature to examine the effects of health insurance 
on child mortality (Dow & Schmeer 2003) and health care utilisation and expenditure 
(Aryeetey et al. 2016; Liu & Zhao 2014; Wagstaff & Lindelow 2008). 
5.3.2 Tests of model assumptions 
5.3.2.1 First stage tests  
Weak instruments can lead to biased IV estimates (Bound, Jaeger & Baker 1995) so it is 
important to test the strength of the instruments. As a preliminary check, the joint 
significance of the instruments can be tested. A commonly used rule of thumb is that an F 
statistic greater than 10 indicates that weak instruments are unlikely to be a concern (Staiger 
& Stock 1997).  
An alternative first stage test was proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). They identified 
critical values based on the greatest acceptable Wald test rejection rate relative to the level 
of significance (for example, rejecting at most 10% of the time when the level of significance 
is 5%). The null hypothesis is that instruments are weak, where weakness is defined as 
causing the test to reject more often than the specified acceptable rate. In this model, with 
potentially heteroscedastic and clustered standard errors, the appropriate test statistic is the 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistic (Baum, Schaffer & Stillman 2007). The critical value in 
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the case of a single instrument and maximal rejection rate of 10% is 16.38 (Stock & Yogo 
2005).4 
5.3.2.2 Robust Hausman test comparing FE with FE-IV 
Joshi and Wooldridge (2019) describe a method to compare the FE and FE-IV models. The 
method involves testing the null hypothesis that 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 is uncorrelated with 𝜖𝑖𝑡 ∀𝑡. Under the 
null hypothesis, both the FE and FE-IV estimators are consistent, and the FE estimator is 
preferred because it is more efficient. However, if the null hypothesis is rejected, only the 
FE-IV estimator is consistent, and is therefore the preferred estimator. 
The test is implemented in three steps:  
1. The first stage equation is estimated by fixed effects: 
𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ Γ1 + 𝐙𝑖𝑡
′ Γ2 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
2. The within-transformed residuals ?̃̂?𝑖𝑡 from step 1 are calculated; 
3. The residuals are added to the health status equation, which is estimated by fixed 
effects: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛄𝟏 + 𝜌1?̃̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 
Under the null hypothesis, 𝜌1 = 0. 
The logic of the test is that, if PHI is endogenous, then 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is correlated with 𝜖𝑖𝑡, the 
idiosyncratic error from (1). In other words:  
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌1𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
where 𝔼[𝑒𝑖𝑡|𝐙𝑖, 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖] = 0. Using (1), this is equivalent to: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛃 = 𝜌1𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛃 + 𝜌1𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
Thus, the test of the null hypothesis 𝜌1 = 0 is a test of the null hypothesis that PHI is 
exogenous and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 are uncorrelated.  
                                                 
4 However, the critical values are calculated under the assumptions of homoscedasticity and no serial 
correlation. These assumptions are likely violated in this panel data context. The critical values should 
therefore be applied with caution (Baum et al. 2007). 
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The test is robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering and takes account of the unbalanced 
nature of the panel. 
5.3.2.3 Test of overidentifying restrictions 
When the model is overidentified (more instruments than endogenous regressors), the null 
hypothesis that the exclusion restrictions are valid can be tested. Under conditional 
homoscedasticity, the Sargan test can be used. The Sargan test statistic is based on the 𝑅2 
from a regression of the IV residuals on 𝒁𝑖𝑡 and 𝐗𝑖𝑡. Under the null hypothesis, this value 
should be close to zero (Wooldridge 2010, p. 123). However, in the case of 
heteroscedasticity or clustering of errors, the Sargan test is invalid (Hoxby & Paserman 
1998). Hansen’s (1982) J statistic is an equivalent robust version (Baum, Schaffer & 
Stillman 2003) which is reported instead. 
 
5.3.3 Instrument choice 
In summary, 𝛽1 can be consistently estimated in the presence of endogeneity if there are one 
or more excluded instruments which, conditional on the other covariates, are: 
1. correlated with 𝑃𝐻𝐼̃ 𝑖𝑡 (“relevant”); and 
2. otherwise uncorrelated with health status (“valid”). 
Possible instruments are considered below. 
5.3.3.1 Instruments in the literature 
Several US papers have used instruments relating to an individual’s marital status and 
employment characteristics (Hadley & Waidmann 2006; Meer & Rosen 2004; Pauly 2005; 
Schumacher et al. 2009). These instruments are relevant because in the US, PHI is 
commonly a benefit of an individual’s own, or their spouse’s, employment. In Australia, this 
is rarely the case. 
Other papers have used policy changes, such as changes in Medicaid eligibility over time, 
as instruments (Andersen 2015; Klick & Markowitz 2006; Miller & Wherry 2018; Pan et al. 
2016). As outlined in Section 2.4, however, there have been few changes to government 
policies relating to PHI since the beginning of the HILDA survey in 2001. Thus, this 
approach is infeasible for this thesis. 
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Finally, other studies have used static features of the institutional environment, such as 
marginal tax rates, as instruments (Dor, Sudano & Baker 2006; Stabile 2001). In addition, 
many studies have exploited discontinuous jumps in insurance coverage as a result of age-
eligibility rules, although most commonly in an RDD rather than IV framework (Card et al. 
2008; Coey 2015; Decker & Remler 2004; Finkelstein & McKnight 2008; Kettlewell et al. 
2018; Lichtenberg 2002). These approaches are most promising for this thesis.  
Australian papers examining the effect of PHI on health care utilisation have also used a 
range of instruments. Cameron et al. (1988) used socioeconomic and health variables to 
instrument for insurance status. These are not suitable for this thesis since they are likely to 
be independently correlated with health status. Cheng (2014) and Cheng and Vahid (2011) 
used the size of the local insurance industry workforce, and distance to nearest private 
hospital, as instruments. These instruments may be correlated with local socioeconomic 
status, which could affect health outcomes. The relevance of the local insurance industry 
workforce instrument has also likely declined over time, as insurance can now be purchased 
online. 
Doiron and Kettlewell (2018) used partner health and partner aspirations for future children 
as instruments, controlling for an individual’s own health, pregnancy, number of children, 
aspirations for future children, and household income. Both instruments may be correlated 
with an individual’s own health status, and therefore are not suitable for this study. 
Kettlewell (2018) used wearing glasses or contact lenses as an instrument for private 
ancillaries insurance. While this is a convincing instrument for ancillaries insurance, 
information on an individual’s use of glasses or contact lenses is not recorded in HILDA. 
Instead, this thesis will follow Eldridge et al. (2017) in using exposure to federal government 
policies to instrument for PHI status. Specifically, the instruments used are a dummy 
variable indicating if an individual is over 31 (hence subject to LHC), and a dummy variable 
indicating if income exceeds the MLS threshold. In the first stage regression, the variables 
were jointly significant, although only the MLS variable was individually statistically 
significant. Eldridge et al. controlled for age and household income, and the squares of both 
of these variables, in their model. However, Doiron and Kettlewell (2018) suggest that these 
instruments may simply capture nonlinearities in the association between age, income, 
insurance and health care utilisation. This issue is revisited below. 
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5.3.3.2 LHC instrument 
As discussed in Section 2.4.3, an individual planning to purchase PHI at any point in their 
life has an incentive to do so before turning 31. A person purchasing PHI after this age must 
pay a penalty in addition to the standard premium. This leads to a discontinuous increase in 
PHI coverage at age 31, which is evident in Figure 6. Thus, the instrument used in this thesis 
is the lagged value of whether an individual is over age 31 at 30 June of the wave year. This 
corresponds to whether the individual was over 31 at the beginning of the last financial year, 
thus capturing whether the individual was subject to LHC for the period in which their PHI 
status is measured (see Section 4.2.1). For example, for wave 17, PHI status is measured for 
the 2016-17 financial year. The lagged instrument is whether the individual was over 31 
years of age as at 30 June of 2016.  
Figure 6 also shows that, as suggested by Doiron and Kettlewell (2018), age and insurance 
coverage do not appear to have a linear or quadratic relationship. However, unlike 
Eldridge et al. (2017), in this thesis a FE-IV model is used, so identification comes from 
changes in PHI status with age. Figure 7 shows the mean change in PHI status by age (that 
is, the mean value of 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 by age). There is a clear positive spike at age 31, 
indicating that individuals are more likely to take up PHI at this age. There are also several 
larger negative values in the early twenties. This likely reflects individuals losing 
eligibility for coverage on their parents’ PHI plans. Typically, all children under age 21, 
and dependent students under age 25, are covered. Thus, changes in coverage at this time 
could be due to life transitions such as finishing full-time study or moving out of the 
family home, which could be correlated with health status through other channels. To 
account for this, the IV analyses control for eligibility for coverage on parent plans. There 
are no other clear patterns with age in Figure 7. In particular, the decline in coverage in the 
late thirties in Figure 1 (which supplementary analysis indicated was limited to individuals 
without children) is not evident. 
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Figure 6: Mean PHI coverage rate over age 
 
Figure 7: Mean change in PHI status over age 
 
 
The effect of LHC on PHI coverage has been studied in several empirical papers. PHI 
coverage rates for those over age 31 increased immediately following the introduction of 
LHC, but the magnitude of the effect has been debated, because several PHI policies 
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changed within a short period (Butler 2002; Frech, Hopkins & Macdonald 2003). 
Palangkaraya and Yong (2007) provide the clearest evidence of the LHC effect. They used 
an RDD to examine the effect of LHC on PHI coverage rates for single people in the 2001 
National Health Survey. They found that LHC was associated with a significant 6.8 
percentage point increase in PHI coverage. The effect was heterogeneous: for high-income 
individuals, there was a 17.2 percentage point increase in coverage, whereas the effect for 
low- and middle-income individuals was not statistically significant. Similarly, coverage 
increased 17.5 percentage points for those who reported at least three long-term conditions, 
whereas the effect for those with fewer conditions was not significant. Thus, at least for 
some groups, LHC appears to be associated with a large increase in PHI coverage. 
However, it is possible that the effect of LHC has dissipated over time. Some authors suggest 
that the advertising campaign which accompanied the introduction of LHC may explain 
more of the increase in coverage rates than the LHC policy itself (Ellis & Savage 2008). 
More broadly, consumer beliefs about the long-term value of PHI could have changed over 
time, which would alter the effectiveness of the policy. 
To be a valid instrument, turning 31 must be uncorrelated with health status, except through 
its effect on PHI, conditional on the covariates. Federal government policies are exogenous 
from the perspective of the individual, so the only concern is that the instrument captures 
age effects. Controlling for age, age squared and eligibility for parental PHI coverage should 
address this. The exclusion restriction would also be violated if there were other policy 
changes at age 31 which affected health status. No such changes were noted in the literature. 
5.3.3.3 Partner LHC instrument 
An alternative instrument is available for individuals who have a partner: a dummy variable 
for whether the partner is over 31. This instrument has not been used in the literature, but 
Doiron and Kettlewell (2018) use partner’s health and partner’s aspirations for future 
children as instruments for PHI. The argument here is similar. PHI decisions within a family 
are highly correlated, so there is likely to be jump in PHI coverage when an individual’s 
partner turns 31, regardless of an individual’s own age. 
The exclusion restriction requires that there is no correlation between an individual’s partner 
being over 31 and an individual’s health status, conditional on an individual’s own age, age 
squared, and eligibility for parental cover. This might be violated if there are spillover effects 
from partner age or health to own health. Controlling for partner’s age and age squared 
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should address this issue. Controlling for an individual’s own LHC status should also capture 
any nonlinear effect of own age on health. After conditioning on these variables, the partner 
LHC instrument is plausibly exogenous. However, the exclusion restriction would still be 
violated if there were other policies commencing at age 31 which affected health status in a 
way that spilled over to partner health status.  
5.3.3.4 MLS instrument 
The MLS provides an incentive for individuals with incomes above the relevant threshold 
to purchase PHI. For many high-income individuals, a basic policy is less than the cost of 
the additional tax payable (Silvester, Jeyaratnam & Jackson-Webb 2018). More generally, 
individuals face a substantially lower effective price of insurance; therefore, theoretically, 
unless demand is perfectly inelastic, PHI coverage should increase at the MLS income 
threshold.  
Figure 8 shows the relationship between PHI coverage and $5000 bins of real income for 
single persons in wave 17, restricted to individuals with income less than $400,000 (in wave 
17 dollars). There appears to be a discontinuous increase in coverage at the MLS threshold 
(indicated by the vertical line). The relationship between income and PHI coverage appears 
to follow an approximately cubic function, so the cube of income will be included in the 
model. 
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Figure 8: Mean PHI coverage rate over $5000 income bins among single people in wave 17 
 
One component of the ACA and Massachusetts reforms in the US was the introduction of 
individual mandates which, similar to the MLS, imposed a tax penalty on the uninsured. 
These mandates led to significant increases in insurance coverage (Hackmann, Kolstad & 
Kowalski 2015; Jacobs 2018). Saltzman (2019) found that consumers in California and 
Washington were more responsive to the existence of the mandate than the amount of the 
penalty, which he interprets as indicating a ‘taste for compliance.’  
In Australia, several studies have documented discontinuous increases in PHI coverage at 
the MLS income threshold (Palangkaraya & Yong 2007). Using an administrative dataset 
of tax returns, Stavrunova and Yerokhin (2014) found that PHI coverage increased by 6.5 
percentage points at the threshold. The effect was particularly large for younger taxpayers.  
This literature suggest that the MLS instrument is relevant. The other requirement is that it 
is uncorrelated with health status except through changes in PHI status. After conditioning 
on income, income squared, and family structure (presence of partner and children), there 
are two key threats to the validity of the MLS instrument. These arise due to other policy 
changes at the same income thresholds. The first is that, in 2011-12 only, one of the income 
tax brackets corresponded to the single income threshold of $80,000. This could lead to a 
change in the relationship between income and health at this threshold, which could be 
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captured by the MLS instrument. To address this, the model using the MLS instrument will 
be estimated excluding wave 12. The second policy shift is the PHI rebate rate, which, from 
2012-13, began to diminish at the MLS income threshold (Table 2). This could have two 
effects. Firstly, it might reduce the magnitude of the MLS effect, threatening the relevance 
of the instrument but not its validity. The more serious concern is that the lower rebate rate 
could lower disposable income for individuals with PHI, which again could lead to a change 
in the relationship between income and health at the threshold. However, this effect only 
applies to individuals who are covered by PHI before and after they cross the MLS threshold. 
Such individuals do not contribute to identification in the FE model. 
Individuals are not liable for the MLS if their own income is below a low-income threshold 
(see Section 2.4.2), regardless of whether their family income is above the family income 
threshold. Thus, an individual’s MLS status might change because they experienced a large 
decrease in personal income, which might not be captured by the family income and income 
squared variables. This could lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction. A large decline 
in personal income could be the result of substantial life changes, such as pregnancy, 
retirement, or the development of a disability, which might also be correlated with changes 
in health status. Thus, individuals whose family income exceeds the MLS family threshold, 
but whose personal income is below the low-income threshold, are excluded from the 
sample. Only 500 observations are excluded for this reason.  
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6 Results 
6.1 Panel data results 
6.1.1 POLS 
Table 11 reports the estimates from the POLS model, controlling for demographics, 
socioeconomic status, time dummy variables, risk behaviours (smoking and exercising), 
willingness to take financial risk, and a lagged health expectations variable. Standard errors 
are clustered at the individual level and are robust to heteroscedasticity. For all results except 
the Kessler score, which measures psychological distress, positive values indicate an 
improvement in health. 
PHI is positively correlated with all indicators of health. The results are significant at the 
0.1% level. Most of the coefficient estimates for the controls are also statistically significant. 
Age, smoking status, and having previously expected a health decline are negatively 
correlated with health status, while income, education, being employed, and regularly 
exercising are positively correlated with all measures of health. The financial risk variable 
was also positively correlated with health status. This contradicts theoretical predictions that 
heterogeneity in risk preferences is a source of advantageous selection (de Meza & Webb 
2001). This could be due to the fact that the risk aversion instrument included in HILDA 
measures willingness to take financial risks. Hence, it could be correlated with 
socioeconomic status. For example, wealthier individuals may be more familiar with 
financial products, or may experience less disutility from the potential loss of a fixed sum 
of money. Thus, the positive correlation between the risk variable and the health measures 
may be driven by the positive correlation between socioeconomic status and health, rather 
than indicating that risk averse individuals typically have worse health. 
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TABLE 11: POLS estimate of Model 1 
 Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
PHI 0.0506*** 1.008*** 0.971*** -0.821*** 
 (0.00587) (0.116) (0.132) (0.0866) 
     
Age -0.0104*** -0.0806*** -0.108*** 0.0240 
 (0.000849) (0.0197) (0.0220) (0.0145) 
     
Age2 0.0000659*** -0.00109*** 0.00249*** -0.00118*** 
 (0.00000866) (0.000215) (0.000231) (0.000150) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 
0.000485*** 0.00855*** 0.00502*** -0.00486*** 
(0.0000480) (0.000946) (0.000992) (0.000659) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 
-0.000000254*** -0.00000392*** -0.00000257*** 0.00000245*** 
(3.26e-08) (0.000000865) (0.000000672) (0.000000535) 
     
Wave 13 0.00630 -0.0932 -0.147  
(0.00427) (0.0781) (0.0880)  
    
Wave 14 -0.00951* -0.186* -0.506***  
(0.00446) (0.0816) (0.0925)  
     
Wave 15 -0.0202*** -0.0328 -0.851*** 0.402*** 
(0.00456) (0.0835) (0.0966) (0.0536) 
     
Wave 16 -0.0103* 0.126 -0.882***  
(0.00461) (0.0857) (0.0982)  
     
Wave 17 -0.00870 -0.0136 -1.135*** 0.656*** 
(0.00463) (0.0868) (0.100) (0.0577) 
     
Male -0.0221*** 0.498*** 0.895*** -0.550*** 
 (0.00578) (0.112) (0.130) (0.0860) 
     
Has 
children 
-0.00108 0.510*** -0.221 -0.297** 
 (0.00651) (0.121) (0.145) (0.0989) 
     
Has partner -0.000237 -0.203 1.923*** -0.943*** 
 (0.00636) (0.138) (0.154) (0.103) 
     
Lives in 
rural area 
0.00544 -0.466* 0.736*** -0.528*** 
 (0.00896) (0.189) (0.202) (0.129) 
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 Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
     
Year 12 or 
diploma 
(ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
-0.0677*** -0.832*** 0.318* 0.194* 
(0.00712) (0.127) (0.152) (0.0955) 
     
Year 11 or 
below (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
-0.104*** -1.639*** 0.367 0.521*** 
(0.00878) (0.182) (0.196) (0.128) 
     
Unemploye
d (ref: 
employed) 
-0.0728*** -0.258 -3.053*** 2.578*** 
(0.0109) (0.215) (0.286) (0.234) 
     
Not in 
labour force 
(ref: 
employed) 
-0.0758*** -3.354*** -2.640*** 1.790*** 
(0.00672) (0.152) (0.170) (0.119) 
     
Current 
smoker 
-0.123*** -0.824*** -1.633*** 1.472*** 
(0.00692) (0.144) (0.174) (0.129) 
     
Regularly 
exercises 
0.182*** 3.028*** 3.069*** -1.579*** 
(0.00461) (0.0889) (0.101) (0.0711) 
     
Take any 
financial 
risk 
0.0546*** 0.830*** 0.775*** -0.498*** 
(0.00499) (0.0948) (0.109) (0.0763) 
     
L.expect 
worse 
health 
 
-0.190*** -5.251*** -4.506*** 2.966*** 
(0.00585) (0.150) (0.158) (0.115) 
_cons 0.757*** 55.11*** 45.31*** 18.65*** 
 (0.0202) (0.406) (0.485) (0.324) 
N 78160 77323 77323 39589 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-assessed 
health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, 
fair or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress.  
For self-assessed health, SF-36 physical health score, and SF-36 mental health score, wave 12 is the 
reference wave for the time effects. For the Kessler score, is measured in waves 13, 15 and 17 only, 
wave 13 is the reference wave. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
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Table 12 reports the POLS estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI, with control variables 
added iteratively. The coefficient estimates for the control variables are not reported. The 
same sample was used across all models, so changes in estimates of 𝛽1 do not reflect sample 
selection. The coefficient on PHI generally decreases in magnitude as more controls are 
added. This indicates that the exclusion of the controls in Model 1 may have led to positive 
omitted variable bias, implying that, in the aggregate, the controls added are positively 
correlated with both PHI and health status (or negatively correlated with both PHI and health 
status). In the insurance context, this implies that the controls are sources of advantageous 
selection.  
Even when the lag of health expectations is added (Model 4 to Model 5), the estimate of 𝛽1 
decreases. The coefficient on the lag of health expectations is negative (Table 11), 
suggesting that individuals who expect their health to decline in one period have worse 
health in the following period. Therefore, in order to account for the positive omitted 
variable bias in Model 4, there must be a negative correlation between expecting a health 
decline and PHI status. This implies that individuals who expect a health decline are less 
likely to be covered by PHI, contrary to theoretical predictions of adverse selection.  
Even in the model with the most comprehensive set of controls, Model 5, PHI is positively 
correlated with health status, and the association is statistically significant at the 0.1% level. 
Individuals with PHI are 5.06 percentage points more likely to report very good or excellent 
health (mean = 0.459, SD = 0.498). PHI is associated with a 1.008 unit increase in SF-36 
physical health component score (mean = 48.899, SD = 10.518) and a 0.97 unit increase in 
SF-36 mental health component score (mean = 48.710, SD = 10.575). PHI is associated with 
a 0.821 unit decrease in Kessler psychological distress score (mean = 15.881, SD = 6.534). 
If the model had a causal interpretation, these estimates would indicate that PHI has a 
moderate positive effect on health. The last row of Table 12 reports the estimated effect of 
PHI for each measure of health status, scaled by the standard deviation of the measure of 
health status. The estimates indicate that the effect is similar in magnitude for all of the 
measures, around 0.1 of a standard deviation. The estimated effect for the Kessler score is 
slightly larger, indicating that PHI is associated with a decrease in psychological distress of 
0.126 of a standard deviation. 
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TABLE 12: POLS estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI  
Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 
physical 
health score 
SF-36 
mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
Model 1 (no 
controls)  
0.126*** 
(0.00612) 
1.717*** 
(0.142) 
2.781*** 
(0.134) 
-2.242*** 
(0.0900) 
Model 2 
(add age, income 
and time dummies) 
0.110*** 
(0.00620) 
1.854*** 
(0.128) 
1.659*** 
(0.139) 
-1.381*** 
(0.0914) 
Model 3  
(add 
demographics) 
0.0843*** 
(0.00624) 
1.468*** 
(0.126) 
1.496*** 
(0.138) 
-1.178*** 
(0.0899) 
Model 4  
(add lifestyle, risk) 
0.0535*** 
(0.00602) 
1.085*** 
(0.122) 
1.036*** 
(0.136) 
-0.867*** 
(0.0888) 
Model 5  
(add lagged 
expected health) 
0.0506*** 
(0.00587) 
1.008*** 
(0.116) 
0.971*** 
(0.132) 
-0.821*** 
(0.0866) 
Model 5 estimate 
scaled by standard 
deviation of health 
measure 
0.102*** 0.0959 0.0918*** -0.126*** 
N 78160 77323 77323 39589 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-assessed 
health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, fair 
or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress.  
In Model 1, PHI is the only regressor. Model 2 controls for age, age2, income, income2, and time dummies. 
Model 3 controls for the same variables as in Model 2, plus demographic controls: gender, presence of 
children, presence of partner, rural status, education, and employment status. Model 4 adds controls for 
current smoking status, whether regularly exercises, and willingness to take financial risks. Model 5 adds 
a control for the lag of health expectations. The standardised coefficient estimates are the Model 5 
coefficient divided by the standard deviation of the health status measure. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
 
Another way to gauge the magnitude of these estimates is to compare the effect of PHI to 
the effect of changes in real family income (measured in 2012 dollars). Table 13 reports the 
change in family income, from the mean of around $85,400, which would generate the same 
change in health status as gaining PHI coverage. The estimates are very large: if the 
coefficients had a causal interpretation, the effect of PHI would exceed the effect of a 
doubling of income, for every measure of health status. The mean household expenditure on 
PHI, among households with positive expenditure, was $2295 in 2012 dollars. Thus, if the 
effect of PHI were interpreted causally, purchasing PHI is an exceptionally cost effective 
health investment.  
However, the estimates reported in Table 13 appear implausibly high, supporting the 
conjecture that the POLS estimates are unlikely to represent a causal effect. Together with 
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the fact that the estimates of 𝛽1 change with the addition of controls, it appears likely that 
PHI status is not randomly assigned in this observational dataset. Attributing a causal effect 
to PHI on the basis of the positive correlation between PHI and health status is therefore 
unlikely to be valid. The estimates are likely to be biased by unobserved omitted variables 
which are positively correlated with both PHI and health status. Such variables could include 
the advantageous selection factors identified in the literature: cognitive ability, general risk 
preference, time preference, family background, or other factors. Many of these factors are 
plausibly stable over time within individuals, implying that a model which accounts for 
individual fixed effects may be appropriate in this setting. 
TABLE 13: Estimated change in income to generate same marginal health effect as PHI 
 
Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 
physical 
health score 
SF-36 
mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
Change in income 
(2012 dollars)  
$114,584 $127,940 $211,712 $184, 912 
Estimates calculated by dividing 𝛽1 from Model 5 by marginal effect of income at the mean income level. 
 
6.1.2 Fixed effects 
The POLS model does not take into account the panel structure of the data, and does not 
account for unobserved individual heterogeneity which is constant over time. Three 
estimators are commonly used in this panel data context: random effects (RE), fixed effects 
(FE), and first differences (FD). For reasons discussed below, the FE estimator is preferred 
for the analysis in this thesis. Table 14 reports the FE estimates of 𝛽1, with controls added 
iteratively, as before. The estimates of 𝛽1 are smaller in size than the POLS estimates and, 
even in Model 1, without any controls added, the estimated effect of PHI is statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level (p-values ranging from 0.181 to 0.973). 
The estimates for the full model, including all control variables, are reported in Appendix 
Table C1. Fewer of the controls are statistically significant than in the POLS model. For 
example, the association between income and health status is no longer statistically 
significant.  
  
74 
 
TABLE 14: FE estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI  
Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 
physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
Model 1 (no controls)  0.00562 
(0.00732) 
-0.0492 
(0.120) 
0.0995 
(0.145) 
-0.0107 
(0.133) 
Model 2 
(add age, income and 
time dummies) 
0.00865 
(0.00730) 
-0.00768 
(0.119) 
0.160 
(0.145) 
-0.0325 
(0.133) 
Model 3  
(add demographics) 
0.00901 
(0.00730) 
-0.00586 
(0.119) 
0.170 
(0.145) 
-0.0478 
(0.132) 
Model 4  
(add lifestyle, risk) 
0.00972 
(0.00724) 
0.00485 
(0.119) 
0.182 
(0.144) 
-0.0658 
(0.131) 
Model 5  
(add lagged expected 
health) 
0.00968 
(0.00724) 
0.00407 
(0.119) 
0.182 
(0.144) 
-0.0650 
(0.132) 
N 78160 77323 77323 39589 
Sargan-Hansen statistic 
for robust Hausman test 
2002.321*** 2101.798*** 1280.527*** 769.149*** 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-assessed health 
is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, fair or poor). 
For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress.  
In Model 1, PHI is the only regressor. Model 2 controls for age, age2, income, income2, and time dummies. 
Model 3 controls for the same variables as in Model 2, plus demographic controls: gender, presence of children, 
presence of partner, rural status, education, and employment status. Model 4 adds controls for current smoking 
status, whether regularly exercises, and willingness to take financial risks. Model 5 adds a control for the lag 
of health expectations. The standardised coefficient estimates are the Model 5 coefficient divided by the 
standard deviation of the health status measure. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
 
An alternative estimator in the presence of an individual fixed effect is the RE estimator. 
The RE estimates of 𝛽1are reported in Appendix Table D1. Similar to the POLS estimates, 
there is a positive, statistically significant association between PHI and health status. 
However, the RE estimator is only consistent when there is no correlation between the 
included regressors and the unobserved individual fixed effect. The implausibly large POLS 
estimates of 𝛽1, as well as the literature on adverse and advantageous selection, imply that 
this assumption is likely to be violated. The last row of Table 14 reports the Sargan-Hansen 
statistic for a robust Hausman test formally testing this assumption. For every measure of 
health status, the null hypothesis of no correlation between the regressors and the individual 
fixed effect is rejected at the 0.1% level of significance. This provides further evidence that 
the RE estimates, and the POLS estimates which rely on the same exogeneity assumption, 
are inconsistent.  
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Both the FE and FD estimators are consistent even in the presence of correlation between 
the regressors and the individual fixed effect. The relative efficiency of the estimators 
depends on whether there is serial dependence in the idiosyncratic errors. Appendix Table 
E1 reports the results of Wooldridge’s (2010) test of this assumption. The results indicate 
that the FE estimator is more efficient, and hence the preferred panel data estimator for this 
thesis. All analyses reported below use the FE model with the full set of time-varying 
controls included in Model 5. 
6.1.2.1  ‘Hit and run’ bias? 
Although the FE model removes unobserved, time-invariant individual heterogeneity, the 
estimates might still be biased by reverse causality or time-varying omitted variables. Some 
individuals’ PHI purchases could be driven by adverse selection, potentially suppressing a 
positive health effect for other individuals in the FE model. For example, there is anecdotal 
evidence of ‘hit and run’ consumer behaviour, whereby individuals experience a health 
decline or anticipate a future health need, take out PHI for the minimum waiting period, use 
it for a procedure, and then drop the coverage again (McAuley 2015).   
To investigate whether such behaviour may be influencing the results, the FE model with 
the full set of controls was re-estimated separately according to whether individuals would 
be hospitalised in the following year.5 If ‘hit and run’ behaviour is suppressing a positive 
effect of PHI, a positive effect should be observed for the individuals who were not 
hospitalised. The relationship between health, PHI and hospitalisation likely differs for 
pregnant women compared to other patients, so women who give birth are excluded.6 Effects 
for these women are considered in the next section. 
Table 15 reports the results. Hospital utilisation is measured less regularly than the other 
variables, so the sample size is smaller, and the model could not be estimated for the Kessler 
score. This change in sample led to a change in the point estimates of 𝛽1, reported in the first 
row, but the estimates remain statistically insignificant. 
Rows 2 and 3 indicate that, regardless of whether an individual has an upcoming hospital 
stay, the effect of PHI on all measures of health status is not statistically significant. The 
point estimates are negative, the opposite of the change which would be expected if the ‘hit 
                                                 
5 Specifically, whether in the next wave they indicated that they had been hospitalised in the past year. 
6 Strictly, women who either give birth or adopt a child in the next year are excluded. 
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and run’ behaviour were leading to a bias in the main estimates. This suggests that this 
adverse selection behaviour is unlikely to be suppressing a true positive effect of PHI in the 
main FE model. 
TABLE 15: FE estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI for sample split by upcoming 
hospitalisation status  
Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
FE Model 5 for sample 
with data on upcoming 
hospitalisation status 
-0.0112 
(0.0159) 
N: 23490 
-0.419 
(0.263) 
N: 23215 
0.112 
(0.322) 
N: 23215 
Hospitalised in next 
year (excluding 
women who give birth 
in next year) 
-0.0302 
(0.0403) 
N: 5225 
 
-0.743 
(1.315) 
N: 5116 
0.0124 
(1.255) 
N: 5116 
Not hospitalised in 
next year (excluding 
women who give birth 
in next year) 
-0.0182 
(0.0194) 
N: 18265 
-0.477 
(0.296) 
N: 18099 
 
0.194 
(0.385) 
N: 18099 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-assessed 
health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, fair 
or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress. All 
models control for age, age2, income, income2, time dummies, presence of children, presence of partner, 
rural status, education, employment status, current smoking status, whether regularly exercises, willingness 
to take financial risks, and the lag of health expectations. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
 
6.1.2.2 Heterogeneous effects 
Figures 9 to 13 illustrate the estimates of 𝛽1 from the main FE model with comprehensive 
controls (Table 14) estimated for subgroups defined by gender, age and income. In almost 
all models, the 95% confidence interval includes zero, indicating that the estimated effect is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, for young people (aged 18 to 35) and 
women, PHI has a positive effect on self-assessed health. Further decomposition into age 
and gender groups (Figure 10) indicated that the positive effect of PHI on self-assessed 
health was limited to young women. One occasion of substantial use of the health care 
system for many young women is pregnancy. The possibility that this is driving this effect 
is explored in Section 6.1.2.3. 
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Figure 9: FE estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI, for self-assessed health 
 
Figure 10: FE estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI, for self-assessed health, for age and 
gender subgroups 
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Figure 11: FE estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI, for SF-36 physical health component 
 
Figure 12: FE estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI, for SF-36 mental health component 
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Figure 13: FE estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI, for Kessler score 
 
6.1.2.3 Heterogeneity by health need 
The health effects of PHI might be greater for individuals with greater health needs, who 
may use the services covered by PHI more frequently. Table 16 reports the estimated effect 
of PHI for sub-groups with potentially higher needs. 
Row B reports the estimated effect of PHI for individuals with a long term health condition.7 
Such individuals may be more frequent users of both private hospitals and ancillary services. 
However, the estimate of 𝛽1 is statistically insignificant at the 5% level for all measures of 
health status. 
Row C reports the estimated effect of PHI for individuals with high psychological distress, 
specifically, individuals whose Kessler score is classified as high or very high risk (Wooden 
2009). Such individuals might particularly benefit from the mental health coverage – both 
                                                 
7 This variable is defined in the HILDA dataset. It is a dummy variable equal to one if an individual 
has a long-term health condition, impairment or disability that restricts them in their everyday 
activities and has lasted, or is likely to last, for six months or more. 
80 
 
in-hospital and outpatient services – provided by PHI. PHI is associated with a statistically 
significant increase in SF-36 mental health score for these individuals. The effect size was 
equal to 0.160 of a standard deviation for this sample. 
The effect on the (continuous) Kessler score is also consistent with an improvement in 
mental health for this group, although this estimate was not significant. One mechanism for 
this effect could be increased access to outpatient psychological services (although the PHI 
variable measures hospital cover only, hospital and ancillaries coverage are highly 
correlated). However, a supplementary regression (column 5) indicated that PHI was not 
associated with an increased probability of having seen a mental health professional 
(psychiatrist or psychologist) in the last year, calling into question the channel through which 
PHI improves mental health outcomes. 
Row D reports the estimate of 𝛽1 for women who gave birth in the twelve months prior to 
the HILDA interview. Maternity care differs between private and public hospitals: private 
hospitals are characterised by higher rates of Caesarean section and other birth interventions, 
partly due to differing provider incentives (Yu et al. 2019). Hence, if PHI induces greater 
use of private hospitals, this different treatment could lead to health effects observable for 
these women only. PHI is associated with a statistically significant decrease in SF-36 mental 
health score, but has an insignificant effect on all other measures of health status. The point 
estimate for the Kessler score is consistent with a decline in mental health, but is not 
statistically significant. 
One threat to causal interpretation of this result is that changes in PHI might be correlated 
with whether a pregnancy was planned, which could in turn be correlated with mental health. 
The typical twelve-month insurer waiting period means that an individual must obtain 
insurance before conceiving in order to be covered for the pregnancy and birth. Therefore, 
a contemporaneous relationship between purchasing PHI and mental health could reflect 
women whose unplanned pregnancy causes them to both purchase PHI (for future coverage 
of the child) and experience a mental health decline. To address this issue, the model was 
re-estimated with the lag of PHI as the key explanatory variable, and a control for the second 
lag of fertility intentions added.8 Results are reported in Row E. In this specification, the 
                                                 
8 Specifically, women were asked to rate on a 1-10 scale how likely they were to have children in the future. 
Overall, approximately 21% of women in the SF-36 estimation sample responded 10 (very likely) to this 
question. A dummy variable equal to one if the respondent indicated 10 was created. 
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estimated effect of PHI on the SF-36 mental health score is smaller and not statistically 
significant at the 5% level. In addition, the estimate for the Kessler psychological distress 
score has been reversed: the lag of PHI is now associated with lower psychological distress. 
The effect size was equal to 0.666 of a standard deviation for this sample. 
As with the positive mental health effect for individuals with high psychological distress 
(row C), this effect does not appear to operate through increased use of outpatient 
psychology services. Column (5) shows that there was no statistically significant change in 
the probability that an individual had seen a psychologist in the last year. 
TABLE 16: FE estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI, for high need groups 
 
 
Self-
assessed 
health 
SF-36 
physical 
health 
score 
SF-36 
mental 
health 
score 
Kessler 
score 
Seen 
psych. in 
last year 
A FE Model 5 for whole 
sample 
0.00968 
(0.00724) 
N: 78160 
0.00407 
(0.119) 
N: 77323 
0.182 
(0.144) 
N: 77323 
-0.0650 
(0.132) 
N: 39589 
0.00157 
(0.0111) 
N: 26646 
B Has long term health 
condition 
0.00183 
(0.0137) 
N: 22983 
0.0153 
(0.296) 
N: 22512 
0.216 
(0.354) 
N: 22512 
0.402 
(0.349) 
N: 11986 
 
C Kessler score high or 
very high risk category 
0.0174 
(0.0294) 
N: 6297 
-0.351 
(0.675) 
N: 6232 
1.668* 
(0.746) 
N: 6232 
-0.332 
(0.460) 
N: 6366 
-0.0200 
(0.0547) 
N: 4261 
D Women who gave birth 
in last year9 
0.0245 
(0.0786) 
N: 1579 
1.128 
(1.354) 
N: 1576 
-4.406* 
(1.845) 
N: 1576 
4.247 
(2.997) 
N: 771 
 
E Effect of lag of PHI for 
women who gave birth 
in last year, controlling 
for fertility intentions 
-0.138 
(0.0848) 
N: 1139 
1.376 
(1.290) 
N: 1139 
-0.747 
(2.184) 
N: 1139 
-4.347* 
(2.064) 
N: 663 
-0.131 
(0.140) 
N: 444 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-assessed 
health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, fair 
or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress. Seen 
psych. in last year is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual has visited a mental health 
professional in the last year. All models control for age, age2, income, income2, time dummies, presence of 
children, presence of partner, rural status, education, employment status, current smoking status, whether 
regularly exercises, willingness to take financial risks, and the lag of health expectations.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Strictly, women who either gave birth or adopted a child. 
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6.1.2.4 Other measures of PHI 
As a robustness check, the main FE model was re-estimated with other measures of PHI as 
the key independent variable. Firstly, the model was re-estimated using the lagged value of 
PHI, which measures whether the individual was covered by PHI for the whole of the 
financial year prior to the most recent year. For example, in wave 17, the financial year in 
question was the 2015-16 financial year. This variable was chosen to address the possibility 
that waiting periods meant that individuals reporting PHI coverage did not have access to 
the services for long before the HILDA survey. 
Secondly, the model was re-estimated with the variable measuring whether the individual 
was currently covered by ancillaries insurance. Services covered by ancillaries insurance are 
generally less well-covered in the public sector, and because they may be preventative in 
nature (Dalziel & Segal 2007; Homeming et al. 2012; Thomson et al. 2010), ancillaries 
insurance could potentially have larger health effects than private hospital cover.  
Finally, the effect of PHI might differ on the extensive and intensive margins. The cheapest 
PHI policies often have large co-payments and many exclusions, so may not be much used 
and therefore have limited impact on health, even if more comprehensive policies are 
associated with positive effects. Therefore, the model was re-estimated with the effect of 
household expenditure on PHI as the key independent variable, among households with 
positive expenditure. 
None of the estimated effects for any of these variables were statistically significant. The 
estimates are reported in Appendix Table F1. 
6.1.3 Alternative models for self-assessed health 
As discussed in Section 5.2, there are a number of ways to account for the categorical nature 
of the self-assessed health variable. Appendix Table G1 presents the estimated effect of PHI 
in a conditional logit model for self-assessed health rated very good or excellent (the same 
dependent variable used in the main analysis); a linear probability and conditional logit 
model of self-assessed health rated fair or poor; and a linear fixed effects model for the five-
point self-assessed health variable. 
In all of the models, the estimated effect of PHI on self-assessed was statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level. 
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6.2 IV results 
6.2.1 First stage 
Column 1 of Table 17 reports the first stage coefficient for the two instruments from two 
stage least squares estimation of the FE-IV model (the full first stage is reported in Appendix 
Table H1). Contrary to findings in the literature, the MLS indicator was not individually 
statistically significant. However, the LHC indicator had a statistically significant effect on 
PHI. The point estimate indicated that individuals who were over 31 at the start of the 
financial year were 4.6 percentage points more likely to have been covered by PHI for the 
whole of that financial year. 
Inclusion of irrelevant instruments can increase the bias of two stage least squares estimates, 
whereas just-identified two stage least squares is approximately unbiased (Angrist & 
Pischke 2009a). Thus, column 2 of Table 17 reports an extract of the first stage using only 
the LHC instrument. The estimated effect of LHC exposure is little changed and remains 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Column 3 reports the first stage estimate for the 
MLS instrument only. The estimate remains close to zero, suggesting that the statistical 
insignificance of the estimate in column 1 is not due to collinearity between the LHC and 
MLS instruments. Column 4 of Table 17 reports the first stage estimate for the LHC 
instrument including wave 12 and excluding income cubed, for consistency with the 
standard FE results.10 Comparing across columns, using only LHC as an instrument provides 
the highest F statistic.  
Hence, the main IV model will be estimated with LHC status as the only instrument. The F 
statistic for this instrument is 20.54, greater than the rule-of-thumb critical value of 10, 
indicating acceptable instrument strength. The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) statistic of 44.404 is 
greater than the relevant Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value, further supporting this 
conclusion.  
  
                                                 
10 The reason for excluding wave 12 was that the income tax bracket corresponded to the MLS income tier for 
this wave; this is not relevant when using the LHC instrument only. 
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TABLE 17: First stage results for sample used to estimate SF-36 physical and mental health 
score models 
 (1) 
PHI 
(2) 
PHI 
(3)  
PHI 
(4) 
PHI 
Over 31 0.0514*** 0.0499***  0.0462*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0116)  (0.0102) 
     
Over MLS 0.00276  0.00318  
 (0.00565)  (0.00566)  
F statistic for test of joint 
instrument significance 
9.93 18.60 0.31 20.54 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) 
Wald rk F statistic 
16.598 25.673 7.531 44.404 
N 62099 62629 62099 75031 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Wave 12 excluded in 
columns (1), (2) and (3). Full model estimates reported in Appendix Table H1. All models control for age, age2, 
income, income2, time dummies, presence of children, presence of partner, rural status, education, employment 
status, current smoking status, whether regularly exercises, willingness to take financial risks, lag of health 
expectations, and eligibility for PHI coverage under parental plan. Columns (1), (2) and (3) also control for 
income3. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
 
6.2.2 IV estimates 
Table 18 reports the FE-IV estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI. The full model is shown 
in Appendix Table I1. The point estimates of 𝛽1 are negative and larger in size than both the 
FE and POLS estimates of 𝛽1. However, the standard errors are also larger, and none of the 
estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, the findings of statistical 
insignificance from the FE models, indicating a null result, are generally confirmed. In 
particular, there is no evidence that adverse selection was suppressing a positive effect of 
PHI in the FE models. 
The second row of Table 18 reports the results from a robust Hausman test comparing the 
FE and FE-IV estimates. Under the null hypothesis, both the FE and FE-IV estimators are 
consistent, and the FE estimator, which is more efficient than the FE-IV estimator, is 
preferred. For every dependent variable, the test fails to reject the null, implying that the FE 
estimates are preferred. 
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TABLE 18: FE-IV estimates of 𝛽1, the coefficient on PHI, using LHC status as instrument 
 Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 
physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
PHI -0.00883 -5.222 -8.216 6.998 
  (0.261) (4.086) (5.400) (4.249) 
N 75881 75031 75031 35898 
𝜌1 from robust Hausman 
test of FE compared to FE-
IV 
-0.0238 
(0.261) 
5.458 
(3.959) 
7.307 
(5.052) 
-5.973 
(3.830) 
𝜒2 value for robust 
Hausman test of FE-IV 
compared to RE-IV 
1417.82*** 1589.04*** 986.52*** 665.68*** 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-assessed health is a 
dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, fair or poor). For the 
Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress. Full model estimates reported in 
Appendix Table I1. All models control for age, age2, income, income2, time dummies, presence of children, 
presence of partner, rural status, education, employment status, current smoking status, whether regularly exercises, 
willingness to take financial risks, lag of health expectations, and eligibility for PHI coverage under parental plan. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
     
6.2.3 Robustness check: partner’s LHC status 
Table 19 reports the estimated effect of PHI from the same model using the lag of an 
individual’s partner’s LHC status as the instrument. The partner’s age, age squared, and the 
individual’s own LHC status are added as controls. Even if there is a nonlinear relationship 
between age and health status, which is captured by the own LHC status instrument, 
partner’s LHC status should still satisfy the exclusion restriction. This advantage comes at 
the cost of excluding single people from the sample. 
The first stage results indicate that the instrument is weaker than in the main IV model. The 
partner LHC indicator is associated with a three percentage point increase in the probability 
of being covered by PHI, and is significant at the 5% level. The F statistic is 6.42, indicating 
that the instrument may be weak, although this may be less concerning in the just-identified 
case (Angrist & Pischke 2009b). Nonetheless, the results should be treated with caution.  
None of the estimates of 𝛽1 are statistically significant at the 5% level. The point estimates 
of the effect of PHI on self-assessed health and SF-36 mental health remain negative. The 
point estimate of the effect of PHI on the SF-36 physical health score has, however, changed 
sign, and now suggests that PHI has a positive effect on physical health. PHI is also now 
predicted to reduce Kessler psychological distress, although this estimate should be greater 
with even greater caution given the smaller sample size available for this variable. 
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6.3 Robustness check: Cumulative PHI 
Some Australian literature suggested that patterns of health care utilisation might vary with 
length of PHI coverage (Lu & Savage 2006; Viney et al. 2006). To assess whether the effect 
of PHI on health might also vary with length of coverage, a POLS model was estimated with 
cumulative years of PHI coverage as the dependent variable. Figures 14 to 16  show the 
estimated effect on self-assessed health, SF-36 physical health component, and SF-36 
mental health component, respectively. The model was not estimated for the Kessler score 
because that variable is measured less frequently. 
The figures show that, in general, the estimated effect size increases with years of coverage. 
For the SF-36 physical health component, the estimated effect appears to increase 
approximately linearly. However, for self-assessed health and the SF-36 mental health 
component, the estimated effect is similar for one to three years of coverage, and then 
increases for four to six years. This suggests that estimates from a single year only might 
misrepresent the health effect of PHI for the long-term insured. 
  
TABLE 19: FE-IV robustness check  
 PHI Self-
assessed 
health 
SF-36 
physical 
health 
score 
SF-36 
mental 
health 
score 
Kessler 
score 
First stage 
Partner over 31 0.0303*     
 (0.0119)     
First stage F statistic 6.48*     
Kleibergen-Paap 
(2006) Wald rk F 
statistic 
6.484     
Second stage 
Estimate of 𝛽1  -0.267 2.524 -7.078 -0.0604 
   (0.456) (7.742) (9.734) (6.171) 
N  49121 48678 48678 22992 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. First stage estimate 
is for the sample available for the SF-36 PHC and MHC scores. Self-assessed health is a dummy variable 
indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, fair or poor). For the Kessler 
score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress. All models control for age, age2, 
income, income2, time dummies, presence of children, presence of partner, rural status, education, 
employment status, current smoking status, whether regularly exercises, willingness to take financial risks, 
lag of health expectations, eligibility for PHI coverage under parental plan, partner age, partner age squared, 
and own LHC status. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 14: POLS estimate of effect of years of PHI coverage on self-assessed health 
 
 
Figure 15: POLS estimate of effect of years of PHI coverage on SF-36 physical health score 
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Figure 16: POLS estimate of effect of years of PHI coverage on SF-36 mental health score 
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7 Discussion and conclusion 
7.1 Summary of findings 
Figure 17 summarises the estimated effect of PHI in the POLS, FE and IV models, in each 
case using the estimate from the model with the most comprehensive set of controls. The 
POLS results suggested that PHI had a significant, positive effect on health status. The 
estimated effect of PHI was very large compared to the effect of other covariates such as 
income (Table 3). Thus, if these estimates represented a causal effect, the case for 
individuals to purchase PHI would be overwhelming. In addition, the case for government 
subsidisation of PHI as a highly cost-effective health intervention would be very strong. 
However, the implausibly large magnitude of these estimates, in addition to the theoretical 
predictions and prior empirical findings regarding asymmetric information and selection, 
suggested that the estimates were likely to be biased. Thus, a FE model was estimated, which 
removed unobserved individual heterogeneity. In this model, the estimated effect of PHI 
was not statistically different from zero for the general population. In order to assess the 
robustness of this finding, and to determine whether the effect of PHI was heterogeneous, 
the model was re-estimated for several subgroups. Firstly, the model was re-estimated 
separately for individuals who had an upcoming hospitalisation episode. If relatively 
unhealthy individuals purchased PHI because they anticipated a specific need, such as 
elective surgery, this adverse selection could have biased the results for the general 
population. However, the estimated effect of PHI remained insignificant even among 
individuals who were not hospitalised in the next year. 
The FE model was then estimated separately for males and females; young, middle-aged, 
and old persons; and those with low-, middle- and high-incomes. The only group for which 
PHI had an effect which was statistically significant was young women. For women aged 
18 to 35 years, PHI was associated with higher self-assessed health. 
Finally, the FE model was estimated for groups with potentially greater health needs, who 
may have used more of the services covered by PHI. For individuals with long-term health 
conditions, there was no significant effect. However, for individuals with high psychological 
distress and women who had given birth in the last year, PHI was associated with 
improvements in mental health. This did not appear to be driven by an increased probability 
that the individual had seen a mental health professional in the last year.  
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The positive effect of PHI on mental health for women who gave birth likely explains the 
positive relationship between PHI and self-assessed health observed for young women, since 
labour is a major cause of private health care utilisation for women in this age group 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017). 
The FE model removed time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, but could have been 
biased by reverse causality or time-varying omitted variables. The conceptual and empirical 
literature suggested that the effect of PHI was likely to be positive or null. Thus, it was 
unlikely that advantageous selection was leading to positive bias and that the true effect of 
PHI was negative. The greater threat was that the insignificant FE results were driven by 
adverse selection. 
To address this concern, an IV model was estimated, using an indicator for whether an 
individual was over 31 as an instrument. As is visually clear from the large confidence 
intervals in Figure 17, the IV estimates were imprecise. However, the point estimates 
provided some confidence that the FE estimates were not driven by adverse selection. For 
each of the measures of health status, the point estimate was negative (positive for Kessler 
score, indicating greater psychological distress), inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
adverse selection was suppressing a true positive effect of PHI. 
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Figure 17: Primary POLS, FE and IV point estimates of 𝛽1, the estimated effect of PHI, and 
95% confidence intervals. See Tables 12, 14 and 18. 
 
7.2 Does PHI affect health? 
Overall, the results of this thesis suggest that PHI does not affect health status in the general 
population in Australia. This supports the conclusion from the literature review that the 
effect of PHI is heavily context-dependent. The mixed findings regarding the effect of 
insurance on health status in the US may reflect differences in the institutional setting across 
states, or in uninsured individuals’ access to health care more generally. 
In this sense, the results from this empirical analysis are not inconsistent with the positive 
effects reported in some US studies (Card et al. 2009; Finkelstein et al. 2012). The 
differences in institutional context between Australia and the US are striking. In Australia, 
Medicare provides comprehensive public health insurance to all Australians, whereas 
uninsured persons in the US have no such guaranteed, comprehensive coverage. Thus, if the 
health production function exhibits diminishing marginal returns, the marginal value of 
additional health care induced by health insurance is likely to be much greater in the US 
than Australia. 
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Within Australia, mental health services are more sparsely covered in the public system than 
other health services, implying that the marginal value of additional care may be greater for 
mental health care. This may explain why some positive effects on mental health were 
observed. Although PHI was not associated with a statistically significant change in the 
probability that an individual saw a psychologist or other mental health professional in the 
last year, there may be differences in usage on the intensive margin or use of in-hospital 
psychiatric services. In particular, because the number of publicly funded mental health 
sessions is capped (Department of Human Services 2019), individuals with PHI may have 
had access to more sessions than those without PHI, the cumulative effect of which could 
have been to improve mental health.  
The effect of PHI on health status also appears to depend on the individual, as well as 
institutional, context. Positive effects on mental health were not observed for the general 
population, only for individuals with high psychological distress and women who had 
recently given birth. In the latter case, the medical literature suggests that the period 
immediately following childbirth can be associated with declines in mental health due to 
depression, anxiety, and other disorders (Cox, Murray & Chapman 1993). Hence, both 
groups may have had higher mental health needs, and been more responsive to the 
psychological services covered by PHI, than the general population.  
7.3 Marginal value of private health care in Australia 
Australian studies have found that individuals with PHI consume more health care overall 
(Meng et al. 2017; Shmueli & Savage 2014), and more private health care in particular 
(Doiron & Kettlewell 2018; Lu & Savage 2006). The results in this thesis suggest that the 
marginal value of this additional health care, and the difference in quality between private 
and public care, are low. PHI had no effect on physical or mental health in the general 
population. This implies that perceptions of superior quality and outcomes in the private 
sector may be misguided. 
Australian papers directly examining differences in patient outcomes between private and 
public hospitals report mixed findings (Jensen, Webster & Witt 2009; Morris, Iacopetta & 
Platell 2007). Forbes et al. (2010) found no differences in adjusted mortality rates between 
large Australian private and public hospitals, although smaller public hospitals generally 
performed worse. Further, randomised controlled trials tend to reject the hypothesis that 
decreases in median waiting times are associated with improved health outcomes for 
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common elective surgeries such as joint replacements (Hirvonen et al. 2007; Hoogeboom et 
al. 2009; Tuominen et al. 2010). The results in this thesis are consistent with these findings. 
Although patients may subjectively prefer private treatment, or experience disutility waiting 
for procedures in the public system (Propper 1995), this does not appear to translate, on 
average, into measurable effects on health.  
Yu et al. (2019) provide one explanation for why health care utilisation may differ with PHI, 
while health outcomes do not. They examined differences in birth intervention rates between 
private and public hospitals, instrumenting for hospital choice with distance to hospital. 
They found that private hospitals typically had higher rates of intervention than public 
hospitals, and physician and hospital incentives explained a large part of this difference. 
Private physicians and hospitals are compensated on a fee-for-service basis, providing a 
financial incentive for greater intervention. Other provider preferences, such as scheduling 
procedures during operating hours and reducing the risk of malpractice litigation, may 
provide further motivation for intervention. Thus, in this context, individuals with PHI may 
receive additional health care, but the marginal effect on health is likely to be low.  
7.4 Methodological contribution 
The results in this thesis highlight the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of PHI 
status. The change in the estimated effect of PHI moving from the POLS results to the FE 
results suggested that the POLS estimates were subject to positive omitted variable bias, 
even after controlling for socioeconomic status, lifestyle factors, financial risk-taking, and 
the lag of health expectations. Pan et al. (2016) and Quesnel-Vallee (2004) reported a similar 
pattern: significant effects in pooled models with extensive controls, and insignificant results 
in FE models. This suggests that the extensive literature relying on selection on observables 
to identify the causal effect of PHI on health (Hogan et al. 2015; Kronick 2009; McWilliams 
et al. 2004; Probst et al. 2008; Wilper et al. 2009) may need to be re-evaluated. 
The thesis also contributes to the literature in its novel application of the LHC and MLS 
instruments to the examination of health status. Consistent with prior studies of the effect of 
LHC (Palangkaraya & Yong 2007), the first stage results in the FE-IV model indicated that 
the instrument was strong and had a positive, significant effect on PHI status. The thesis 
addressed the concerns raised by Doiron and Kettlewell (2018) regarding nonlinear 
relationships between age, PHI, and health by controlling for individuals’ eligibility for 
coverage under their parents’ plan, and using partner’s LHC status as an instrument in a 
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robustness check. Though weaker, the results from the robustness check did not alter the 
substantive conclusions from the FE or FE-IV models. 
The fact that the MLS instrument was insignificant contrasts with the finding in Eldridge et 
al. (2017), where the MLS instrument was significant and the LHC instrument individually 
insignificant. This result also differs from the wider body of empirical research suggesting 
that the MLS is associated with increases in PHI coverage. There are several possible 
explanations. The first is sample size. The MLS threshold is relatively high; only 11.6% of 
the sample was over the MLS income threshold. As a result, few individuals are likely to 
transition above or below the threshold each year. The limited HILDA sample may have 
been too small to accurately identify the MLS effect from these few transitioning 
individuals. Larger administrative datasets may be more appropriate for identifying this 
effect.  
Further, the MLS threshold may have been inaccurately identified, either due to inaccurate 
measurement of taxable income in HILDA or because the increase in PHI coverage actually 
occurs after the threshold. A series of papers using tax return data found that the jump in 
PHI occurred $2,500 to $5,600 above the applicable threshold of $50,000 (Gong & Gao 
2018; Kang et al. 2015). One explanation for this is that, to avoid the MLS, individuals must 
be covered by PHI for the whole of the financial year, yet may not know their exact taxable 
income until the end of the financial year. This could dilute the size of the increase in PHI 
coverage at the MLS threshold.  
7.5 Adverse and advantageous selection 
The positive omitted variable bias in the POLS results (compared to the FE results) is 
consistent with advantageous selection in the Australian PHI market (Buchmueller et al. 
2008). In addition, despite multiple attempts to account for it, no evidence for adverse 
selection was found. In the first stage FE-IV results (Appendix Table H1), the lag of 
expecting a health decline was not a significant predictor of PHI status. The point estimate 
was negative, indicating that individuals who expected a health decline were less likely to 
be covered by PHI in the next period. This is the opposite of the relationship predicted by 
adverse selection. More generally, the coefficients on PHI in the POLS and FE models were 
unchanged or decreased with the addition of the lag of health expectation as a control. If the 
PHI market were characterised by adverse selection, the opposite effect would be expected 
(Fang et al. 2008). In addition, there was no evidence of adverse selection when estimating 
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the model separately for individuals according to whether they had an upcoming 
hospitalisation (Section 6.1.2.1), suggesting that ‘hit and run’ behaviour may not be 
widespread. Finally, the IV results, though imprecise, did not provide any evidence that the 
FE estimates were biased by adverse selection. The point estimates were negative, the 
opposite of the direction expected if adverse selection were a source of bias. 
These findings have implications for policy in Australia. Industry fears about an adverse 
selection death spiral may be unwarranted (Duckett & Nemet 2019). Even if the age 
composition of the insured pool is changing, the work in this thesis suggests that the pool is 
likely to still be lower risk than the general population. Policies designed to address adverse 
selection, such as LHC (Brown & Connelly 2005) and, more recently, the provision of 
premium discounts to individuals aged under 30 years (Sivey & Cheng 2019), may be 
unnecessary. 
The evidence for advantageous selection also raises questions about the equity implications 
of subsidising PHI. The majority of the benefit of the subsidises accrues to relatively healthy, 
high socioeconomic status individuals (Palangkaraya et al. 2009; Walker et al. 2005). Gans 
and King (2003) argued in favour of PHI subsidies using a model that assumed adverse 
selection dominated the market. In their model, relatively unhealthy individuals were more 
likely to purchase PHI, yet also paid for the public system through taxes, in effect subsidising 
relatively healthy individuals who only relied on the public system. The government PHI 
rebate partly corrected this inequity. The results in this thesis, and other empirical literature 
documenting advantageous selection in Australia, suggest that the opposite may be true. PHI 
subsidies may represent a transfer from relatively unhealthy, disadvantaged persons to 
relatively healthy, advantaged persons. 
7.6 Is purchasing PHI irrational? 
If consumers’ goal in purchasing PHI was to improve their health, this thesis suggests that 
the purchase may be irrational. There was no evidence that PHI affected health status for 
most people, and the opportunity cost of PHI premiums is income which could be spent on 
other, potentially health-improving goods. The possible exception to this conclusion is 
individuals with greater need for mental health services, such as those with high 
psychological distress and pregnant women, for whom PHI was associated with 
improvements in mental health. These effects were relatively large in size, particularly for 
the latter group, whose symptoms of psychological distress declined by two-thirds of a 
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standard deviation. Considering the fact that few of the covariates, including household 
income, were significant in these FE specifications, this suggests that PHI may be a 
worthwhile investment for these individuals. 
However, even for the general population, consumer surveys suggest that individuals’ 
purchase of PHI is not motivated by a belief that it will lead to substantial health 
improvements. Instead, motivations such as peace of mind and desire for treatment as a 
private patient dominate (Table 1). Yet the belief that PHI will ensure superior health 
outcomes in the event of a negative health shock may be implicit in these ideas of security 
and protection. Natalier and Willis (2008), in a qualitative study, suggest that individuals’ 
purchase of PHI may partly be an attempt to cope with anxiety about the prospect of future 
health declines, and a manifestation of a belief that private health care will protect against 
negative health outcomes. The results of this thesis suggest that these beliefs may be 
unwarranted. 
PHI does offer some clear benefits for consumers. Consumers may value the coverage of 
ancillary services, physician choice, shorter waiting times and superior amenities. This 
thesis merely emphasises that improvements in health status do not count among the 
practical benefits of PHI for consumers. 
7.7 Should governments subsidise PHI? 
This thesis began with the observation that Australian government expenditure on PHI 
subsidies comprised 8% of the federal health budget, yet the return on this expenditure had 
rarely been examined. Overall, the results suggest that this expenditure does not deliver 
improvements in health status in the general population.  
The FE results suggested that there were some positive effects on mental health for two 
groups: individuals with high psychological distress and women who had recently given 
birth. Given that these groups are comparatively small in size, it is likely that similar or 
larger effects could be achieved with more targeted, less costly interventions than a PHI 
subsidy for the general population. Indeed, even direct subsidisation of private health care 
for these groups may be less expensive than subsidising PHI for the entire population. This 
would also be more equitable than subsidising PHI, which is disproportionately held by 
relatively advantaged individuals. 
However, improvements in health are not emphasised in the political rhetoric surrounding 
PHI subsidies (Duckett & Nemet 2019). Instead, the benefits extolled include relieving the 
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burden on the public sector, facilitating consumer choice, and providing support for ancillary 
services. This thesis cannot directly inform the broader debate about the merits of these 
arguments. However, the mere fact that PHI has positive benefits does not imply that it 
should be subsidised, or that it is the most cost-effective way to achieve these goals (Duckett 
et al. 2019; Lu & Savage 2006; Vaithianathan 2002). Cheng (2014) found that PHI coverage 
rates were relatively inelastic to price changes in Australia, so reducing the subsidy may not 
substantially alter coverage rates. 
7.8 Limitations and directions for research 
Although several strategies were used to address the endogeneity of PHI, the possibility 
remains that the estimated effect of PHI was biased. For example, some of the covariates 
may have been endogenous, possibly due to reverse causality between health and income, 
exercise habits, or the other control variables, which would lead to bias in the estimated 
effect of PHI.  
 As discussed in Section 3.2.1, an RCT, where PHI coverage is randomly assigned, can be 
used to identify the causal effect of PHI with high internal validity. A large-scale RCT is 
unlikely to take place, not least due to cost constraints. However, an RCT need not be so 
comprehensive in order to yield meaningful insights into the effect of PHI. Australian and 
US studies suggest that informational frictions can be significant barriers to take-up of PHI, 
and that targeted advertising campaigns or enrolment assistance can yield substantial 
increases in coverage (Aizer 2007; Ellis & Savage 2008). Thus, a future research strategy 
could be to randomise the provision of information – for example, information about LHC 
– and then monitor the effect of the differential take-up of PHI on health outcomes. 
An important data limitation was the lack of information on the coverage and conditions of 
individuals’ PHI policies. There is wide variation in insurance policies, from ‘junk 
insurance’ policies that have high excesses and many exclusions (often purchased merely to 
avoid financial penalties such as the MLS and LHC), to comprehensive policies with full 
coverage and no out-of-pocket costs. In addition, previous research suggested that insured 
individuals’ use of private health care differed according to whether their PHI purchase was 
motivated by financial or other concerns (Viney et al. 2006). The HILDA dataset did not 
distinguish between these types of policies and patterns of use, but their effect on health may 
differ. This heterogeneity also implies that the IV estimates, which estimated the effect on 
health of changes in PHI status induced by financial concerns (the LHC policy), might not 
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be representative of the health effects for those who purchase PHI for other reasons. Future 
research with more comprehensive data (for example, linked insurance claims and health 
data) would be valuable. 
As noted in Section 3.1.1, health is typically modelled as a stock variable (Grossman 1972). 
Therefore, modelling changes in health status due to changes in PHI over a relatively short 
time period may be fundamentally inappropriate. It is possible that PHI has a significant 
cumulative effect over time which was not detected in this thesis. Similarly, Lu and Savage 
(2006) show that use of private health care among the insured differs with length of 
coverage. Thus, the FE estimates may not be an accurate estimate of the health effect of PHI 
for individuals who are continuously covered for many years.  
The robustness check in Section 6.3 provided some preliminary evidence in support of this 
cumulative effect hypothesis. In POLS models, the estimated effect of PHI on health 
appeared to grow, in some cases nonlinearly, over time. This suggests that the cumulative 
effects of PHI are an important direction for future research. 
7.9 Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the effect of PHI on health status in Australia. Overall, PHI had no 
effect on physical or mental health status in the general population, suggesting that 
government subsidisation of PHI cannot be justified on the basis of population health 
benefits. Although PHI was associated with improved mental health outcomes for 
individuals with high psychological distress and women who had recently given birth, it is 
likely that there are more cost-effective ways of achieving these outcomes than a general 
subsidy. More generally, the results of the thesis emphasise the importance of the 
institutional and individual context in determining the marginal value of additional health 
care and the effect of health insurance. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Relationship between SF-36 items, scales, and summary measures 
 
Source: Ware et al. (1994) 
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Appendix B: Items comprising Kessler psychological distress score in HILDA 
survey 
Source: Wooden (2009) 
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Appendix C: FE model estimates 
APPENDIX TABLE C1: Full estimates from fixed effects model  
 Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
PHI 0.00968 0.00407 0.182 -0.0650 
 (0.00724) (0.119) (0.144) (0.132) 
     
Age 0.00474 0.215* -0.304** 0.306*** 
 (0.00479) (0.0845) (0.0975) (0.0458) 
     
Age2 -0.0000135 -0.00535*** 0.00317*** -0.00231*** 
 (0.0000243) (0.000470) (0.000529) (0.000406) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 
1.31e-06 -0.0002477 -0.0012564 -.0000869 
(0.0000454) (0.0008251) (0.0009271) (0.000708) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 2 
5.60e-09 1.26e-06 -3.54e-07 9.47e-08 
(3.31e-08) (6.85e-07) (5.79e-07) (3.97e-07) 
     
Wave 14 -0.0274*** -0.0499 -0.330*  
(0.00685) (0.120) (0.136)  
     
Wave 15 -0.0504*** 0.116 -0.613** 0.111** 
(0.0107) (0.187) (0.213) (0.0400) 
     
Wave 16 -0.0455** 0.345 -0.559  
(0.0146) (0.257) (0.291)  
     
Wave 17 -0.0508** 0.255 -0.662  
(0.0186) (0.326) (0.370)  
     
Presence of 
children 
-0.0210** 0.332* -0.316* -0.370** 
(0.00766) (0.140) (0.159) (0.128) 
     
Presence of 
partner 
-0.00329 -0.785*** 1.269*** -0.520** 
(0.00842) (0.149) (0.208) (0.179) 
     
Rural status 0.00254 -0.0856 0.249 -0.0579 
 (0.0124) (0.212) (0.251) (0.203) 
     
Year 12 or 
diploma (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
-0.0307* 0.0740 0.0346 -0.186 
(0.0154) (0.245) (0.348) (0.302) 
     
Year 11 or 
below (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
-0.0207 0.322 -0.356 0.402 
(0.0251) (0.427) (0.578) (0.522) 
     
Unemployed 
(ref: 
employed) 
0.000973 0.430* -0.920*** 0.864*** 
(0.00975) (0.182) (0.228) (0.228) 
     
Not in labour 
force (ref: 
employed) 
-0.00902 -0.787*** -1.014*** 0.618*** 
(0.00638) (0.126) (0.144) (0.127) 
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 Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
     
Current 
smoker 
-0.0301*** 0.102 -0.540** 0.480* 
(0.00880) (0.156) (0.201) (0.203) 
     
Regularly 
exercises 
0.0688*** 1.124*** 1.460*** -0.780*** 
(0.00375) (0.0679) (0.0785) (0.0694) 
     
Take any 
financial risk 
-0.00143 -0.109 0.202* -0.0428 
(0.00409) (0.0727) (0.0855) (0.0786) 
     
L.expect 
worse health 
-0.0147** -0.297** -0.134 0.398*** 
(0.00465) (0.0978) (0.110) (0.0994) 
     
_cons 0.299 52.35*** 54.34*** 7.785*** 
 (0.00375) (0.0679) (0.0785) (0.0694) 
N 78160 77323 77323 39589 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-
assessed health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as 
opposed to good, fair or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in 
psychological distress. The Kessler score is measured in waves 13, 15 and 17 only.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix D: RE model estimates 
APPENDIX TABLE D1: Full estimates from random effects model  
 Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
PHI 0.0522*** 0.893*** 0.859*** -0.759*** 
 (0.00486) (0.0896) (0.104) (0.0800) 
     
Age -0.00896*** -0.0139 -0.0934*** 0.0221 
 (0.000789) (0.0176) (0.0205) (0.0144) 
     
Age2 0.0000417*** -0.00217*** 0.00205*** -0.00105*** 
 (0.00000799) (0.000191) (0.000213) (0.000147) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 
0.0003323*** 0.0059589*** 0.0028971*** -0.003938*** 
(0.0000376) (0.0008188) (0.0007561) (0.0005868) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 2 
-1.58e-07*** -2.09e-06* -1.97e-06*** 1.92e-06*** 
(2.83e-08) (8.93e-07) (5.15e-07) (4.93e-07) 
     
Wave 13 0.00720 -0.0874 -0.112  
(0.00404) (0.0715) (0.0808)  
     
Wave 14 -0.0113** -0.214** -0.519***  
(0.00419) (0.0745) (0.0838)  
     
Wave 15 -0.0247*** -0.109 -0.884*** 0.414*** 
(0.00429) (0.0762) (0.0883) (0.0476) 
     
Wave 16 -0.0125** 0.0475 -0.921***  
(0.00436) (0.0783) (0.0896)  
     
Wave 17 -0.0103* -0.113 -1.150*** 0.645*** 
(0.00437) (0.0803) (0.0916) (0.0512) 
     
Male -0.0114* 0.504*** 1.086*** -0.640*** 
 (0.00561) (0.111) (0.129) (0.0880) 
     
Presence of 
children 
-0.00807 0.489*** -0.196 -0.373*** 
(0.00535) (0.100) (0.117) (0.0863) 
     
Presence of 
partner 
0.000537 -0.474*** 1.674*** -0.824*** 
(0.00542) (0.109) (0.137) (0.100) 
     
Rural status 0.00297 -0.273 0.552** -0.395** 
 (0.00776) (0.152) (0.171) (0.121) 
     
Year 12 or 
diploma (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
-0.0793*** -1.044*** -0.0202 0.317*** 
(0.00652) (0.114) (0.143) (0.0961) 
     
Year 11 or 
below (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
-0.129*** -2.122*** -0.425* 0.930*** 
(0.00819) (0.167) (0.190) (0.132) 
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 Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
Unemployed 
(ref: 
employed) 
-0.0330*** -0.0238 -1.668*** 1.676*** 
(0.00869) (0.166) (0.212) (0.195) 
     
Not in labour 
force (ref: 
employed) 
-0.0480*** -1.977*** -1.826*** 1.338*** 
(0.00520) (0.110) (0.124) (0.0998) 
     
Current 
smoker 
-0.0991*** -0.789*** -1.372*** 1.306*** 
(0.00600) (0.115) (0.144) (0.122) 
     
Regularly 
exercises 
0.110*** 1.738*** 1.976*** -1.158*** 
(0.00338) (0.0620) (0.0715) (0.0586) 
     
Take any 
financial risk 
0.0228*** 0.275*** 0.407*** -0.282*** 
(0.00361) (0.0654) (0.0767) (0.0637) 
     
L.expect 
worse health  
-0.0808*** -1.899*** -1.487*** 1.567*** 
(0.00418) (0.0936) (0.102) (0.0875) 
_cons 0.785*** 55.14*** 46.05*** 18.37*** 
 (0.0188) (0.370) (0.457) (0.325) 
N 78160 77323 77323 39589 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-
assessed health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as 
opposed to good, fair or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in 
psychological distress. The Kessler score is measured in waves 13, 15 and 17 only. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix E: FE vs FD 
The test proposed by Wooldridge (2010, p. 283) can be used to determine whether the FE 
or FD model is more efficient. If the 𝜖𝑖𝑡 are homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated, the FE 
estimator is more efficient. However, if there is substantial serial dependence in the 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (they 
follow a random walk), the FD estimator is more efficient. Thus, testing for serial 
dependence in the 𝜖𝑖𝑡 can distinguish which estimator is more efficient.  
The test is implemented by regressing the residuals from the first differences model on their 
lag: 
𝜖?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?2𝜖?̂?𝑡−1 + ξ𝑖𝑡 
Under the FD assumption, ?̂?2 = 0. Under the FE assumption, ?̂?2 = −0.5. 
The test was not conducted for the Kessler score, which is measured every second wave. 
Table A1 shows the FD estimates of 𝛽1, as well as the estimate of ?̂?1. For all dependent 
variables, the null hypothesis that ?̂?2 = 0 is rejected, but the null hypothesis that ?̂?2 = −0.5 
is also rejected. The estimates are, however, closer in size to -0.5 than 0. This suggests that 
the FE model is preferred for these data. 
Differences between FD and FE estimates can indicate a violation of the strict exogeneity 
assumption (𝜖𝑖𝑡 uncorrelated with regressors in all time periods) which underlies consistency 
of both estimators, as in the case of a violation they have different probability limits. The 
FD estimates of 𝛽1 are all statistically insignificant at the 5% level, and not dissimilar to the 
FE estimates. Thus, this informally provides some confidence that the assumption may be 
valid. 
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APPENDIX TABLE E1: FD estimate of 𝛽1 and test of serial correlation in idiosyncratic error 
 Self-assessed health SF-36 physical health 
score 
SF-36 mental health 
score 
FE estimate of 𝛽1 0.00968 
(0.00724) 
0.00405 
(0.119) 
0.182 
(0.144) 
FD estimate of 𝛽1 0.0103 0.0700 0.153 
 (0.00818) (0.133) (0.160) 
?̂?2  -0.461***  
(0.00397) 
-0.444*** 
(0.00408) 
-0.442*** 
(0.00411) 
F statistic for test  
?̂?2 = −0.5 
96.62*** 191.23*** 198.66*** 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-assessed 
health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, 
fair or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress. 
All models control for age, age2, income, income2, time dummies, presence of children, presence of 
partner, rural status, education, employment status, current smoking status, whether regularly exercises, 
willingness to take financial risks, and the lag of health expectations.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix F: Alternative measures of PHI 
APPENDIX TABLE F1: Fixed effects estimates of effect of various measures of PHI on health status, waves 
12 to 17 
 Self-assessed 
health 
SF-36 physical 
health score 
SF-36 mental 
health score 
Kessler score 
Lag of PHI -0.00848 0.155 -0.0253 0.0756 
 (0.00786) 
65257 
(0.138) 
64568 
(0.167) 
64568 
(0.124) 
39349 
Real household 
expenditure on PHI 
(2012 $), among 
households with 
positive expenditure 
0.00000128 
(0.00000166) 
46217 
0.0000143 
(0.0000280) 
45871 
-0.0000363 
(0.0000353) 
45871 
0.0000128 
(0.0000309) 
23426 
Private ancillaries 
insurance 
0.00714 0.0166 0.399 -0.101 
(0.0142) 
26312 
(0.248) 
26028 
(0.286) 
26028 
(0.156) 
26497 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-assessed 
health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as opposed to good, fair 
or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in psychological distress. All 
models control for age, age2, income, income2, time dummies, presence of children, presence of partner, rural 
status, education, employment status, current smoking status, whether regularly exercises, willingness to take 
financial risks, and the lag of health expectations. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
 
Appendix G: Alternative self-assessed health models 
APPENDIX TABLE G1: Alternative models and dependent variable specifications for estimate 
effect of PHI on self-assessed health 
Model Dependent variable Estimated effect of PHI 
Linear probability model with 
fixed effects 
Dummy: self-assessed health 
very good or excellent 
𝛽1=0.00968 
(0.00724) 
Conditional logit Dummy: self-assessed health 
very good or excellent 
OR = 1.095 
(0.0716) 
Linear probability model with 
fixed effects 
Dummy: self-assessed health fair 
or poor 
𝛽1 = -.00660 
(0.00494) 
Conditional logit Dummy: self-assessed health fair 
or poor 
OR = 0.926 
(0.0806) 
Linear fixed effects Five-point self-assessed health 𝛽1= .0205 
(0.0114) 
“OR” = odds ratio. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in 
parentheses. All models control for age, age2, income, income2, time dummies, presence of 
children, presence of partner, rural status, education, employment status, current smoking status, 
whether regularly exercises, willingness to take financial risks, and the lag of health expectations.  
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix H: First stage results 
APPENDIX TABLE H1: First stage regression estimates from FE-IV model, for sample used to 
estimate SF-36 physical and mental health score models 
 PHI PHI PHI PHI 
Over 31 0.0514*** 0.0499***  0.0463*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0116)  (0.0102) 
     
Over MLS 0.00276  0.00318  
 (0.00565)  (0.00566)  
     
Age 0.0146*** 0.0142*** 0.0183*** 0.0180*** 
 (0.00345) (0.00343) (0.00341) (0.00317) 
     
Age2 -0.0000521* -0.0000499* -0.0000808*** -0.0000957*** 
 (0.0000228) (0.0000228) (0.0000227) (0.0000196) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 
0.000274*** 0.000309*** 0.000275*** 0.000276*** 
(0.0000541) (0.0000501) (0.0000541) (0.0000376) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 2 
-0.000000256*** -0.000000316*** -0.000000257*** -0.000000142*** 
(6.11e-08) (6.53e-08) (6.12e-08) (3.13e-08) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000)3 
6.26e-11*** 7.97e-11*** 6.31e-11***  
(1.72e-11) (1.96e-11) (1.72e-11)  
     
Wave 14    0.00101 
    (0.00382) 
     
Wave 15 -0.00467 -0.00475 -0.00466 -0.00248 
 (0.00380) (0.00378) (0.00380) (0.00610) 
     
Wave 16 -0.0194** -0.0187** -0.0192** -0.0151 
 (0.00612) (0.00609) (0.00613) (0.00834) 
     
Wave 17 -0.0295*** -0.0289*** -0.0291*** -0.0241* 
 (0.00844) (0.00840) (0.00844) (0.0106) 
     
Presence of 
children 
-0.00845 -0.00881 -0.00577 -0.00576 
 (0.00602) (0.00599) (0.00599) (0.00562) 
     
Presence of 
partner 
0.00949 0.00936 0.00915 0.00602 
 (0.00782) (0.00777) (0.00782) (0.00699) 
     
Rural status -0.0102 -0.00960 -0.00994 -0.0189* 
 (0.00938) (0.00939) (0.00937) (0.00895) 
     
Year 12 or 
diploma (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
0.0276 0.0269 0.0294 0.0263 
(0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0149) 
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 PHI PHI PHI PHI 
     
Year 11 or 
below (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
0.0370 0.0356 0.0407 0.0323 
 (0.0221) (0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0202) 
     
Unemployed 
(ref: 
employed) 
0.00491 0.00544 0.00525 0.00205 
 (0.00645) (0.00642) (0.00646) (0.00612) 
     
Not in labour 
force (ref: 
employed) 
0.00662 0.00819 0.00690 0.00355 
 (0.00485) (0.00480) (0.00486) (0.00435) 
     
Current 
smoker 
0.000515 0.000520 0.00107 0.00409 
 (0.00654) (0.00652) (0.00654) (0.00621) 
     
Regularly 
exercises 
-0.00114 -0.00122 -0.00141 -0.00235 
 (0.00246) (0.00244) (0.00246) (0.00228) 
     
Take any 
financial risk 
-0.000343 -0.000551 -0.000221 0.00258 
 (0.00289) (0.00288) (0.00289) (0.00269) 
     
L.expect 
worse health 
-0.000145 -0.0000944 -0.000251 -0.00166 
 (0.00319) (0.00319) (0.00319) (0.00293) 
     
Parent cover 0.0563*** 0.0556*** 0.0618*** 0.0690*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0111) 
     
N 62099 62629 62099 75031 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Columns 
1 to 3 exclude wave 12. Column 4 includes wave 12. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix I: Full FE-IV estimates with LHC status instrument 
APPENDIX TABLE I1: FE-IV model estimates, using LHC status as instrument 
 Self-assessed 
health 
PHC MHC Kessler score 
PHI -0.00883 -5.222 -8.216 6.998 
 (0.261) (4.086) (5.400) (4.249) 
     
Age 0.00458 0.329** -0.105 0.189* 
 (0.00713) (0.123) (0.152) (0.0806) 
     
Age2 -0.0000111 -0.00600*** 0.00198* -0.00138* 
 (0.0000397) (0.000712) (0.000863) (0.000662) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 
0.0000101 0.00119 0.000942 -0.00172 
(0.0000857) (0.00141) (0.00178) (0.00130) 
     
Family 
income 
($’000) 2 
1.22e-09 0.000000521 -0.00000149 0.000000873 
(4.97e-08) (0.000000954) (0.000000949) (0.000000680) 
     
Wave 14 -0.0273*** -0.0452 -0.323*  
 (0.00689) (0.122) (0.140)  
     
Wave 15 -0.0504*** 0.101 -0.635** 0.0411 
 (0.0107) (0.190) (0.220) (0.0596) 
     
Wave 16 -0.0457** 0.266 -0.687*  
 (0.0149) (0.266) (0.309)  
     
Wave 17 -0.0512** 0.128 -0.866*  
 (0.0193) (0.343) (0.400)  
     
Presence of 
children 
-0.0210** 0.318* -0.342* -0.295* 
 (0.00770) (0.144) (0.166) (0.142) 
     
Presence of 
partner 
-0.00369 -0.756*** 1.333*** -0.568** 
 (0.00859) (0.155) (0.220) (0.196) 
     
Rural status 0.00246 -0.185 0.0822 0.140 
 (0.0132) (0.232) (0.279) (0.247) 
     
Year 12 or 
diploma (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
-0.0275 0.215 0.178 -0.321 
 (0.0171) (0.294) (0.403) (0.375) 
     
Year 11 or 
below (ref: 
Bachelor’s) 
-0.0173 0.505 -0.149 0.163 
 (0.0264) (0.475) (0.617) (0.591) 
     
Unemployed 
(ref: 
employed) 
0.00119 0.442* -0.906*** 0.806*** 
 (0.00979) (0.182) (0.234) (0.245) 
125 
 
     
 Self-assessed 
health 
PHC MHC Kessler score 
     
Not in labour 
force (ref: 
employed) 
-0.00888 -0.768*** -0.985*** 0.555*** 
 (0.00646) (0.129) (0.149) (0.141) 
     
Current 
smoker 
-0.0301*** 0.125 -0.499* 0.435* 
 (0.00886) (0.161) (0.210) (0.215) 
     
Regularly 
exercises 
0.0688*** 1.110*** 1.438*** -0.738*** 
 (0.00381) (0.0697) (0.0820) (0.0784) 
     
Take any 
financial risk 
-0.00139 -0.0954 0.224* -0.0646 
 (0.00415) (0.0745) (0.0896) (0.0855) 
     
L.expect 
worse health 
-0.0147** -0.306** -0.148 0.410*** 
 (0.00467) (0.0991) (0.112) (0.104) 
     
Parent cover -0.00670 0.408 0.905 -0.846 
 (0.0232) (0.375) (0.492) (0.462) 
N 75881 75031 75031 35898 
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered on individuals) in parentheses. Self-
assessed health is a dummy variable indicating self-assessed health very good or excellent (as 
opposed to good, fair or poor). For the Kessler score, negative coefficients indicate a reduction in 
psychological distress. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. 
 
